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This Article introduces an investor-orented framework for the
evaluation of renewable energy policy, applies these newly developed
critea to a qualitative comparison of the primary policy instruments,
and offers recommendations to enhance the investor appeal of
renewable energy in the United States.
The multi-trillion dollar task of scaling-up renewable energy
technologies to mitigate climate change, ensure energy security, and
create green jobs is one of the most daunting challenges of the twenty-
first century It is, in fact, too great a challenge for either the public or
private sector to shoulder alone. Rather, public policy must catalyze
private investment in renewable energy Empirical evidence of
deployment support for renewables from thirty-five countries reveals
enormous differences in policy performance. Remarkably, some
policies leverage four times as much investment in renewable energy as
others, despite offering only half as much compensation to renewable
power project developers. These results point to forces at play other
than policy remuneration and generation costs alone.
To better understand these forces, this Article develops a
framework of criteria to guide the evaluation of deployment policies
beyond remuneration. Unlike previous studies, this Article assumes an
investor perspective to explore how investment-based, market-based,
and behavioral "soft-cost" factors determine a policy's ability to spur
investment in renewable energy. Application of these "soft-cost"factors
to analye the primary policy instruments across the globe sheds light
on their conceptual capacity to promote the deployment of renewable
energy technologies. The results offer an explanation for the observed
weak correlation between policy performance and remuneration.
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Indeed, the most successful and cost-effective deployment policies are
those with the most favorable impact on the examined "soft-cost"
factors and, hence, with the greatest conceptual appeal to renewable
energy investors.
Drawing on these insights, this Article develops recommendations
for the design and implementation of policies that offer greater appeal
to renewable energy investors and allow for faster deployment of
renewables-at lower cost to American ratepayers and taxpayers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The challenge of scaling-up technologies for the generation of
electricity from renewable energy sources (renewables) is often compared
to the 1960s Space Race.' In his 2011 State of the Union address, President
Obama referred to America's pressing energy challenges as "our generation's
Sputnik moment."2 Indeed, there are striking parallels between the Space
Race and the Race to Renewables,3 beginning with the shared need for
technological innovation at an unprecedented scale. It is no coincidence that
the newly established Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-
E) tasked with promoting the necessary energy innovations is modeled after
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which is
responsible for the development of many crucial space technologies. Like
the Space Race was in the 1960s, the Race to Renewables is motivated, at
least in part, by concerns over national security. Just as maintaining the
balance of power with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a major
motivation for NASA's Apollo Project,5 one of the drivers behind the Race to
Renewables is the desire to enhance America's energy security by
decreasing its dependence on foreign oil and gas from geopolitically
unstable parts of the world.!
1 See, e.g., JAY INSLEE & BRACKEN HENDRICKS, APOLLO'S FIRE: IGNITING AMERICA'S CLEAN
ENERGY EcONoMY 2-3 (2008); Daniel Van Fleet, Note, Legal Approaches to Promote
Technological Solutions to Climate Change, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Oct. 10, 2008, at 2, 28,
available athttp://www.1aw.duke.edu/journaLs/dltr/articles/pdf/1ldltr65.pdf.
2 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in [the] State of
the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/
remarks-president-state-union-address (last visited July 20, 2012).
3 This Article deliberately employs the term Race to Renewables instead of the broader
term Clean Energy Race. To the extent that so-called clean energy technologies rely on non-
renewable sources that are subject to eventual depletion, they cannot offer a long-term solution
to America's and the world's energy challenges. While these technologies have a role to play as
bridge technologies in the short to medium term, only renewable energy technologies can
provide long-term solutions and, hence, are the focus of this work.
4 For more details on the parallels between DARPA and ARPA-E, see AM. ENERGY
INNOVATION COUNCIL, A BUSINESS PLAN FOR AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE 26 (2010), available at
http://www.americanenergyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/AEICThe-Business
Plan_2010.pdf.
5 See Van Fleet, supra note 1, at 2.
6 See Alan Nogee et al., The ProjectedImpacts of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard,
ELEC. J., May 2007, at 33, 43; Shelley Welton, Note, From the States Up: Building a National
Renewable EnergyPolicy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 987, 987 (2009).
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Despite these apparent similarities, the analogy between the Space
Race and the Race to Renewables is, in fact, an understatement. The latter
features many more participants, including most industrially developed and
many developing nations.' More importantly, the Race to Renewables has
considerably higher stakes, adding overwhelming environmental and
economic issues to concerns over national security.8 Successful climate
change mitigation requires that today's carbon-intensive economy turn low-
carbon by 2050.' Only a complete and rapid transformation of the energy
sector can limit global warming to a temperature increase of two degrees
Celsius compared to pre-industrialization levels."o This two-degree scenario
is vital to avoid massive and irreversible disruptions of the global
ecosystem." The necessary energy revolution will require massive efforts to
improve energy efficiency and to facilitate the timely transition to a low-
carbon electricity sector based on renewable sources of clean energy.
The large-scale deployment of renewables is by no means a purely
environmental concern; it is also of significant economic importance. The
U.S. electricity generation sector alone boasts annual retail revenues of
more than $350 billion." Global investment in solar energy technology has
increased by over 250% annually between 2004 and 2008.3 According to a
2011 survey among 350 venture capitalists from four different continents,
more general partners anticipate an increase of venture capital investment
7 For an overview of the policy activism to promote renewables, see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY,
DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICIES 94-156, 173-74 (2008),
[hereinafter INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I], available at http://www.ieaorg/textbase/nppdf/free/2008/
deployingrenewables2008.pdf
8 See Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: Fryom Grand Provider to Market
Facilitator 25 ENVTL. L. 715, 718-19, 726 (1995).
9 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: WHAT Do WE
Do? 6 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/41/41753450.pdf, see also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 67
(2007), [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at http://www.ipec.ch/publications
.and data/publicationsipccjfourth assessment report-synthesis _report.htm. While carbon
dioxide is only one of many greenhouse gases-others include methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride-it is the most prominent in the
electricity sector and, hence, the focus of this Article and its terminology. See generally Energy
Info. Admin., Greenhouse Gases, Climage Change, and Energy: What are Greenhouse Gases,
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapterl.html (last visited July 19, 2012) (describing how
greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide, contribute to climate change).
10 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 113 (2009).
11 For an overview of peer-reviewed studies and warnings not to exceed the two-degree
scenario, see IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 9. See also Comm'n of the European
Communities, Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius. The Way Ahead for 2020
and Beyond, at 3-5, COM (2007) 2 final (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0002en01.pdf
12 Annual revenue was $353 billion in 2009, down from $364 billion in 2008. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2009, at 10 (2011).
13 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 10, at 162 fig.3.7; see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, Support
Schemes for Renewable Electricity in the EU, 31-35 (2010) (noting the various renewables-
promoting policies and support schemes of several European countries).
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for clean technology than for any other industry segment." Some analysts
forecast that by 2030, one in four U.S. workers, i.e., 37 million Americans,
could be employed in the renewable energy and energy efficiency
industries-assuming appropriate public policy support. Others emphasize
that a renewables-based energy sector will create more jobs per megawatt of
power installed, per unit of energy produced, and per dollar of investment
than a fossil fuel-based energy sector." Denmark's world-leading wind
turbine industry demonstrates the export potential of American-made clean
energy products." Conversely, American dependence on foreign oil
continues to drive up the U.S. trade deficit with daily imports worth
approximately $1 billion." The 2008 oil price-shock cost the U.S. economy
some $500 billion, underscoring the economic importance of improving the
nation's energy security and independence.'9
The good news is that a timely transition to a low-carbon, renewables-
based electricity sector appears within technological reach. In 2008, former
Vice President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore announced his plan to
"Re-power America"20 with 100% clean electricity from renewables within a
decade. Since then, over half a dozen independent studies have confirmed
the technological feasibility of meeting the entire electricity demand of a
given country,2' region, or even the world,23 with renewable sources of
14 DELOITIE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN VENTURE CAPITAL: STATE OF THE IPO MARKET (2011),
available at http://www.deloitte.com/view/enUS/us/press/Press-Releases/bdd907c8aalbO3lO
VgnVCM1000001956f0OaRCRD.htm. Venture capital and private equity investment in renewable
energy recently exceeded $100 billion annually. Mary Jean Bilrer & Rolf Wilstenhagen, Which
Renewable Energy Policy is a Venture Capitabst's Best Friend. Empirical Evidence from a
Survey ofInternational Cleantech Investors, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 4997, 4999 (2009).
15 AM. SOLAR ENERGY SOC'Y, DEFINING, ESTIMATING, AND FORECASTING THE RENEWABLE
ENERGY AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. AND IN COLORADO 33 tbl.VII-1 (2008),
available athttp://cospl.coallance.org/fez/eserv/co:2056/govll2r292008internet.pdf.
16 DANIEL M. KAMMEN ET AL., PUTTING RENEWABLES TO WORK: How MANY JOBS CAN CLEAN
ENERGY INDUSTRY GENERATE? 3 (2004), available at http://rael.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files
very-old-site/renewablesjobs.2006.pdf.
17 See Judith Lipp, Lessons for Effective Renewable Electricity Policy from Denmark
Germanyandthe UnitedKingdom, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 5481, 5492 (2007).
18 Ait. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 8.
19 Id. at 10.
20 Al Gore, Speech on Renewable Energy at Constitution Hall (July 17, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=92638501 (last visited July 20, 2012).
21 See generally PAUL WILLSON, ET AL., POWERING THE FUTURE - MAPPING OUR LOW-CARBON
PATH TO 2050 (2009) (discussing the potential for renewable energy deployment in the U.K.);
MATI'HEW WRIGHT & PATRICK HEARPS, AUSTRALIAN SUSTAINABLE ENERGY: ZERO CARBON
AUSTRALIA STATIONARY ENERGY PLAN (2010).
22 See generally EUROPEAN CLIMATE FOUND., ROADMAP 2050 - A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO A
PROSPEROUS, LOW-CARBON EUROPE (2010); ARTHOUROS ZERVOS, ET AL., RE-THINKING 2050: A 100%
RENEWABLE ENERGY VISION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 100%
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY: A ROADMAP TO 2050 FOR EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA (2010)
23 See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, Providing all Global EnergV with Wind, Water,
and Solar Power, Part I Technologies, Energy Resources, Quantities and Areas of
Infrastructure, and Materials, 39 ENERGY POL'Y 1154, 1164 (2011) [hereinafter Wind, Water, and
Solar Powerl; Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, A Path to Sustainable Energy by 2030, 301
SC. AM, Nov. 2009, at 58, 64 [hereinafter Path to Sustainable Energy].
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energy. In their timeframes for the shift to renewables, the feasibility studies
range from 205024 as mandated by the two-degree scenario, to 2030, to an
extremely ambitious Gore-esque transition as early as 2020.26
The bad news is that we remain far from harnessing the full
technological potential of power generation from renewable sources of
energy. Current projections forecast that renewables will account for only
15% of American electricity generation by 2035.27 Compared to a renewables
share of 10% in 20 10,28 the projected growth over the next quarter of a
century is relatively modest. Our business-as-usual trajectory, therefore, is
too slow to reap the trifecta of environmental, economic, and energy
security rewards that await the winner of the Race to Renewables. One U.S.
commentator has already warned that, without a strong commitment to
renewables, "we may look toward a future of imported clean technology as a
substitute for imported dirty fuels."29
A whole plethora of obstacles presently stand in the way of a timely
scale-up of renewable energy technologies. Economists have long warned of
environmental externalities and other market failures and imperfections in
the electricity sector that hinder renewables in their competition with fossil
fuel incumbents .3 Recent legal scholarship has investigated regulatory and
other non-economic barriers to the large-scale deployment of renewable
energy technologies, offering policy recommendations to cut through the
red tape.'
Even if these barriers are removed, scaling-up renewable energy
technologies will still require an enormous infusion of capital. At a
macroeconomic level, the overall cost of transitioning to an electricity sector
based on renewables has been estimated at around $100 trillion globally-
not including the necessary investments in transmission infrastructure.
Notwithstanding recent growth in venture capital and other clean-tech
investment, the transition to a low-carbon, renewables-based electricity
sector will require a massive influx of trillions of dollars in additional
24 EUROPEAN CLIMATE FOUND., supra note 22, at 9; WILLSON, ET AL., supra note 21, at 05:06;
ZERVOS ET AL., supra note 22, at 6; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 22; Wind, Water, and
SolarPower, supra note 23, at 1154.
25 Path to Sustainable Energ, supra note 23.
26 WRIGHT & HEARPS, supra note 21, at XV-XX.
27 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE-EIA 0383(2012), ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 3 (2011).
28 Id.
29 Miller, supra note 8, at 731.
30 See, e.g, NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEw 347
(2007); European COMM'N. supra note 13, at 9-14 (2010); Atanas Kolev & Armin Riess,
Environmental and Technology Externalities Policy and Investment Implications, 12 EEB
PAPERS 134, 143 (2007); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and
EnvironmentalPolicy, 54 ECOLOGICAL EcON. 164, 168 (2005).
31 Felix Mornann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 960
(2011) (noting that "there is considerably more red tape to be cut through for a megawatt of
new capacity from renewable electricity than for the same capacity from fossil fuels").
32 Path to Sustainable Enery, supra note 23, at 64.
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capital. 3 An investment of such magnitude, however, exceeds the financial
means of even the wealthiest nations-including the United States,
burdened with a national debt exceeding $15 trillion. 4 Budget austerity
measures make it unlikely that military spending can provide renewable
energy technologies with the type of capital injection that has helped other
emerging technologies, such as the Internet or GPS, reach the stage of
commercial application. The private sector, therefore, is called upon to
provide the capital necessary for the large-scale deployment of renewables.
From the private sector's microeconomic perspective, investment in
renewable energy technologies is wrought with risks and uncertainties
about, for example, technology innovation, fuel price development, emission
regulation and pricing, and the fiercely debated comparative advantage
between centralized utility-scale generation and distributed generation.
The high-stakes, high-risk nature of energy investment is exacerbated by the
notoriously long "valley of death" between the proof of concept and
commercial deployment of power generation technologies.37 In the
information technology industry, a simple mouse click may be all it takes to
bring a new website or smartphone application online for its large-scale
commercial deployment. In contrast, electricity generation technology often
requires up-front investment of hundreds of millions of dollars to prove its
suitability for large-scale commercialization. It is in these early stages of
commercial deployment, however, that banks and financial markets are the
most reluctant to provide the direly needed capital, much less at low cost.
This Article starts with the presumption that public policy should serve as a
catalyst to leverage the necessary private sector investment to deploy
renewable energy technologies at scale.
Public policy support for renewables deployment across the globe
presently manifests itself as four general policy approaches:' first, as feed-in
tariffs, which offer producers of electricity from renewable sources
subsidized rates for power sold to the grid;39 second, as tender regimes that
invite competitive bids for contracts over the supply of electricity from
33 See, e.g, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES - SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 23 (2011), avalable at http://srren.ipccw
g3.de/repor/IPCCSRREN FullReport.pdf.
3 See US. Debt Clock, http://www.usdebtclock.org (last visited July 7, 2012).
35 For the military's role as a driver of innovation, see CHARLES WEISS & WILLIAM B.
BONVILLIAN, STRUCTURING AN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 20 (MIT Press 2009); AM. ENERGY
INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 22.
36 For an instructive example of the demands of energy technology portfolio planning, see
PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER-CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF
ELECTRIC UTILITIES 124-25 (2010).
37 WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 35, at 31, 40; see also Karsten Neuhoff, Large-Scale
Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation, 21 OXFORD. REV. ECON. POL'Y 88, 97-98
(2005) (referring to the many barriers facing new, innovative technologies as compared to their
more conventional and well-established incumbent competitors).
38 For an overview, see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 92-94.
39 The first nations to establish feed-in tariffs were Portugal (1988), Germany (1990),
Denmark (1992), and Spain (1994). MIGUEL MENDONQA ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY -
THE FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK 77 (2009).
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renewables to the grid;" third, as tax incentives that reward the investment
in renewable power plants through investment tax credits or the production
of electricity from renewables through production tax credits;" and fourth,
as renewable portfolio standards (RPSs), which require an increase of the
share of renewables in the respective jurisdiction's energy mix. Coupled
with renewable energy certificates, RPSs allow power generators that draw
on renewable sources to sell both their electricity and the corresponding
certificates to earn more than the market rate for electricity alone.42
In contrast to the international potpourri of policies, the political and
scholarly debate over deployment support for renewables in the United
States has been dominated by RPSs and the controversy over whether they
are best implemented at the federal or state level. 3 More than twenty-five
proposals for a federal RPS have been introduced on Capitol Hill, but none
has passed both chambers to date.A In the meantime, some thirty states
have adopted RPSs.45 Following the political discourse, the scholarly
community, too, has focused its attention primarily on the merits of RPSs
and the ideal institutional level for their implementation .4  All along, the
40 International advocates of tender regimes include the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada,
China, and most recently Denmark for offshore wind farms. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra
note 7, at 94-95.
41 Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), producers of
electricity from renewables may claim either investment tax credits or production tax credits.
Pub. L. No. 111-5 §§ 1101-02, 123 Stat. 319. For details, see BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., REASSESSING
RENEWABLE ENERGY SUBSIDIES - ISSUE BRIEF 6 (2011), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/
sites/defaultfiles/BPCRE%20Issue%20Brief 3-22.pdf.
42 Early adopters of REC trading regimes include Belgium (Flanders), Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. See Anna Bergek & Staffan Jacobsson, Are Tradable Green Certificates a Cost-
Efficient Policy Divmg Technical Change or a Rent-Generating MachineLessons from Sweden
2003-2008,38 ENERGY POL'Y 1255, 1256 (2010).
4 In contrast, tax incentives such as those provided under section 1603 of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act have elicited comparatively little debate among politicians and
scholars. For details on the section 1603 incentives, see BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 41,
at 6-7.
44 For a summary of the congressional deadlock over a federal RPS, see Lincoln L. Davies,
Power Forward: The Aigument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2010). See also
Welton, supra note 6, at 996.
45 As of June 2012, 29 states and the District of Columbia have implemented RPSs, 8 more
states have adopted non-binding goals for the deployment of renewables. See Database of State
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Quantitative RPS Data Project http://www
.dsireusa.org/rpsdatalindex.cfn (last visited July 21, 2012). For a discussion of the history and
political background of state RPSs, see BARRY G. RABE, RACE TO THE Top: THE EXPANDING ROLE
OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2006), available at http://www.c2es.org/
docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf.
46 See generally Davies, supra note 44, at 1399; Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans:
Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level, 19 ELEC. J., Mar. 2006, at 52; Joshua P.
Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National Renewable Portfolio
Standard on the US Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49 (2008); Joshua P. Fershee, Moving
Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looldng Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1405 (2010) [hereinafter Fershee, Moving Power Forward]; Robin J. Lunt, Recharging
US Energy Policy: Advocating for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 371 (2006-2007); Robert J. Michaels, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard:
Politically Correct, Economically Suspect, ELEC. J., Apr. 2008, at 9; Robert J. Michaels, National
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superiority of RPSs over other deployment policies appears to be taken for
granted, despite strong empirical evidence to the contrary. In fact, one of the
most comprehensive studies to date observed that feed-in tariffs deliver up
to four times the deployment success of RPSs-at half the cost." Yet, the
heated debate among legal scholars over a national versus state RPS appears
to have left little room to consider other policies in support of renewables'
large-scale deployment. One commentator aptly describes the distractive
spell of the RPS debate: "It also distracts policy makers from addressing the
tangible legal, regulatory, and economic obstacles faced by developers of
renewable power projects."' Ultimately, the goal of every policy to promote
renewables deployment is to attract private-sector investment. It is all the
more surprising, therefore, that no previous article has examined these
policies from the investor's point of view. This Article aims to close that gap
with three original contributions.
This Article is the first to assume an investor perspective to develop a
framework of criteria that can guide the evaluation of renewable energy
policies beyond sheer remuneration. My analysis applies this framework of
"soft-cost" factors to the primary policy instruments across the globe, and
explains their vastly different policy performances. The results of this
analysis allow me to develop recommendations for more cost-effective and
investor-friendly renewable energy policies in the United States.
Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture., 29 ENERGY L. J. 79 (2008);
Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got it Right: There's no Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 27 ENERGY L. J. 451 (2006); Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress
Got It Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for
Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 85 (2008) [hereinafter Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got
It Wrong]; Benjamin K Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, State Efforts to Promote Renewable
Energy Tipping the Horse with the Cart?, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 5 (2007) (hereinafter
Sovacool & Cooper, State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy]; Welton, supra note 6. For an
economic analysis of state renewable portfolio standards see CLIFF CHEN ET AL., ERNEST
ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STATE
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE-LEVEL POLICY IMPACT
PROJECTIONS (2007), available athttp://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/61580.pdf.
47 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 106 fig.3.
48 Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425,
1450 (2010). To the limited extent the legal literature does address other policies in support of
renewables deployment, it is usually in the broader context of climate change policies. See Van
Fleet, supra note 1, at 3 (providing a cursory overview of climate change policies in general);
Neil Craik & Joseph F. C. Dimento, Climate Law and Policy in North America: Prospects for
Regionalism, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 195 (2009) (examining the status quo and
future potential for regional climate-change governance in North America); Timothy P. Duane,
Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable
Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 711-12
(2010) (discussing renewables along with energy efficiency and electricity transmission);
Andrew Schatz, A Tale of Three Signatories: Learning From the European Union, Japanese, and
Canadian Kyoto Experiences in Crafting a Superior United States Climate Change Regime, 70 U.
PITr. L. REV. 593 (2009) (employing a more comparative approach). For a rare in-depth
discussion of non-RPS policies, see David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, The Role of Feed-in
Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of Solar Energy Production, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 943 (2010);
Lincoln L. Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio Standards
andFeed-in Tariffs, 1 KLRI J.L. & LEGIs. 39 (2011).
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Part II opens with an overview of the primary policy approaches to
promote renewables deployment: feed-in tariffs, tender regimes, tax
incentives, and renewable portfolio standards. Part III reviews empirical
evidence from thirty-five countries regarding these policies' efficacy and
efficiency at promoting the large-scale deployment of renewable energy
technologies. The results of this secondary data analysis indicate that policy
efficacy does not necessarily correlate with high levels of remuneration,
pointing to forces at play other than generation costs alone.
Against this background, Part IV develops a framework of criteria to
guide the analysis of deployment policies beyond their remuneration levels.
Unlike previous studies, this Article assumes an investor perspective to
explore how investment-based, market-based, and behavioral factors
determine a deployment policy's capacity to leverage investment in
renewable energy technologies. Consideration of these "soft-cost" factors
allows for a better understanding of each policy's conceptual capacity to
promote the large-scale deployment of renewables.
Part V examines an array of investment-based, market-based, and
behavioral "soft-cost" factors to determine the ability (or inability) of the
aforementioned policy quartet to leverage investment in renewable energy
technologies. The results of my analysis offer an explanation for the
observed weak correlation between policy efficacy and remuneration, and
for the superior performance of feed-in tariffs as the policy with the greatest
conceptual appeal to renewables investors. Part VI offers policy
recommendations to enhance the investor appeal and,. hence, deployment
success of renewable energy in the United States.
II. THE GLOBAL POLICY POTPOURRI-AN OVERVIEW
In light of compelling environmental, economic and security-related
concerns, most industrially developed nations have adopted policies to
promote the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. 9
Despite the general consensus on the underlying policy rationale, the
different measures vary considerably in their design, implementation, and
success. Deployment policies across the globe run the gamut from
libertarian and market-driven to command-and-control.
There is no universally accepted dichotomy or classification for
deployment policies in support of renewable energy technologies."0 Some
49 See Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources, pmbl., art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 140)
16, 27 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0028
:EN:NOT (stating that renewable energy development is necessary to reduce GHG. emissions
and establishing a framework for developing renewable energy in the European Union). See
also Lunt, supra note 46, at 374 ("It makes sense ecologically, economically, and for national
security to create policies that promote the development of new renewable energy sources.").
50 See JOHN A. ALIC ET AL., U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICIES: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE 15 (2003), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/us-technology-innovation-
policies.pdf (noting that "the United States has never had a coherent set of innovation policies"
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commentators categorize such policy measures according to the level of
government intervention.1 Others distinguish between quantity-based and
price-based policies." Yet another classification differentiates between
policy measures that incentivize investment in equipment for electricity
generation from renewables and policies that reward the operation of such
equipment." The "California Wind Rush" of the 1980s and more recent
experiences with wind farms in India have shown investment-based
deployment incentives to be less effective at raising the share of renewables
in the electricity mix in the long term than operation-based incentives.4
Accordingly, this Article focuses on deployment policies that reward the
operation of equipment for the generation of electricity from renewables-
renewable portfolio standards, tender regimes, feed-in tariffs, and
production tax credits.'
A. Renewable Portfoho Standards
Renewable portfolio standards-also known as renewable quota
obligations-are generation-based, quantity-driven policy instruments.5 An
RPS requires the addressees-usually electricity utility companies-to
source a certain share of the electricity they sell from renewable sources of
energy.55 Utilities prove their compliance with these requirements through
renewable energy credits (RECs)." These RECs are issued, usually on a per
kilowatt-hour (kWh) or megawatt-hour (MWh) basis, to producers of
and that "no universally accepted nomenclature or taxonomy summarizes or describes" policies
affecting innovation).
51 Eg, Van Fleet, supra note 1, at 1 3 (suggesting four categories of technological
development, including "market-related incentive" and "creation of government institutions").
52 E.g, Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical Review of Promotion Strategies for Eectricity
from Renewable Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV.
1003, 1011 (2011).
5 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 92.
54 See MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 171. In particular, investment-based deployment
incentives fail to reward continuous service and maintenance of generation facilities. As a
result, many of the wind turbines installed across California in the early 1980s operated only
briefly or intermittently. In fact, some clean energy pioneers claim that many of these early
wind turbines were not even connected to the grid. See id. (discussing the unreliability of the
early wind farms built "to take advantage of tax credits" and not to "produce electricity.")
55 Infra Parts II.A-D.
56 Haas et al., supra note 52, at 1014.
57 Unlike most countries, Sweden initially aimed its RPS at electricity consumers. In 2006,
however, the Swedish RPS was amended to target electricity utility companies. See Bergek &
Jacobsson, supra note 42, at 1258.
58 In contrast, some jurisdictions, including eight states in the U.S., have adopted merely
voluntary renewable energy goals. Davies, supra note 44, at 1386. In light of their limited
promotional impact, this Article ignores such voluntary renewables goals and focuses on
mandatory RPSs.
59 Haas et al., supra note 52, at 1014; MENDONQA et al., supra note 39, at 155, 161.
Internationally, these are also referred to as Tradable Green Certificates or Renewable Energy
Guarantees of Origin. Id. at 156.
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electricity from eligible renewable sources of energyi' Non-utility power
generators sell the electricity they produce at regular market prices. In
addition, they can also sell the corresponding RECs to utilities, thereby
receiving a premium for their reliance on renewables. Alternatively, utilities
that are subject to RPSs can invest in their own renewable energy power
generation facilities to earn RECs for the electricity they produce. At the end
of each reporting period, utilities are required to hold RECs tantamount to
the share of renewables in the electricity mix set forth by the RPS. Failure to
do so triggers penalty payments designed to enforce compliance with the
RPS. In general, RPSs are technology-neutral and award the same amount of
RECs for all eligible strands of renewable energy technologies. Some
jurisdictions, however, have implemented technology-specific RPSs that
offer credit multipliers for select renewables technologies."
RPSs have been particularly popular at the U.S. state level, as
demonstrated by their adoption by twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia. 62 Around the world, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium, and
Australia feature prominently among the nations who have adopted RPSs to
promote the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. 6
B. Tender Regimes
Under a tender regime-sometimes described as a reverse auction
mechanism-the government invites competitive bids to supply a specified
amount of electricity from a certain renewable energy technology over a pre-
determined period of time." The successful bidder is awarded a long-term
power purchase contract at its winning bid's price per kWh. The additional
cost, i.e., the winning bid's premium over the market rate of electricity, is
usually recovered through a levy or system benefits charge that is
distributed across all ratepayers."6 In contrast to RPSs, tender regimes are
6o See Davies, supra note 44, at 1359.
61 See, eg, id. at 1377 (pointing to technology-specific REC multipliers in no less than 16
states in the U.S.).
62 See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Quantitative RPS Data
Projec4 http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm (last visited July 7, 2012). The first state to
adopt an RPS was Iowa in 1983. Davies, supra note 44, at 1357.
6 See MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 150-51; see also INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra
note 7, at 94-95 tbl.2 (listing countries that utilize RPSs).
6 For an introduction to the terminology and mechanics of tender regimes / reverse auction
mechanisms in liberalized markets see Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, Tendering Universal
Service Obligations in Liberalized Network Industries 2 (Swiss Economics, Working Paper No.
0013, 2009), available athttp://www.swiss-economics.ch/RePEc/files/0013JaagTrinkner.pdf.
65 For further information on tender regimes in the renewable electricity context, see Claus
Huber et al., Economic Modelling of Price Support Mechanisms for Renewable Energy Case
study on Ireland, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 1172, 1175 (2007); INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 92.
66 Robert Gross & Phil Heptonstall, Time to Stop Experimenting with UKRenewable Energy
Policy 8 (Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy and Technology, Working Paper No.
ICEPT/WP/2010/003, 2010), available at https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/icept/Public/Time%
20to%20stop%20experimenting.pdf.
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inherently technology-specific, as the call for bids specifies the eligible
strand of renewable energy technologies.67
China, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and some states in the
United States have used tender regimes to promote the deployment of
various renewable energy technologies.' Most recently, Denmark has relied
on tender regimes for offshore wind farms."
C Feed-In Tariffs
Feed-in tariffs, or FITs, are two-pronged policy instruments for the
promotion of renewables' large-scale deployment.o The "feed-in" element
guarantees renewable electricity generators the right to connect to the
power grid. The "tariff' element requires local utilities to purchase the
power that these generators feed into the grid at subsidized rates above
market prices for an extended period of time." The subsidized rates
determine a fixed total price for electricity from renewables, a premium to
be paid in addition to the market price, or a percentage of retail rates." The
cost of the tariffs subsidy is usually distributed across all electricity
customers so as not to unduly burden the electric utilities or the
government." As a price-based policy instrument, feed-in tariffs require
regulators to set the subsidized rates at a level that is high enough to
incentivize private sector investment in power generation from renewables
without offering windfall profits." Feed-in tariffs are usually technology-
specific, offering different tariff rates to different strands of renewable
energy technologies, typically based on their respective technological
67 See MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 174-75.
6 Bent Ole Gram Mortenson, International Experiences of Wind Energ, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY
L. & POL'Y J. 179, 202 (2008); Haas et al., supra note 52, at 1020; MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 34,
at 174-75.
69 Haas et al., supra note 52, at 1020.
70 See Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet US.
Renewable Electricity Targets, ELEc. J., May 2007, 73. For a detailed description of the various
feed-in tariff design elements, see MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 35, at 15-38. In the U.S., feed-in
tariff regimes are increasingly referred to as "CLEAN Programs" (Clean Local Energy
Accessible Now). For further information see: http://www.clean-coalition.org/introduction-to-
clean-programs/ (last visited July 7, 2012). See also John Farrell, CLEAN v SRECs: Finding the
More Cost-Effective Solar Policy (October 2011) at 4, available at http://energyselfreliantstates
.org/content/clean-v-srecs-finding-more-cost-effective-solar-policy.
71 The duration of this purchase obligation ranges from 8 years in Spain, to 15 years in
France, to 20 years in Germany. See Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies
Aimed at Promoting Renewables, 12 EIB PAPERS 110, 115 (2007), available at http://www.eib.
orglattachnents/efs/eibpapersleibpapers_2007_v12_nO2leibpapers_- 2007_v12_nO2_a05__.en.pdf.
72 The second option is sometimes referred to as a "feed-in premium" or "premium feed-in
tariff." See MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 40. For an example of the retail rate percentage
option see Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed in Tarif, Quota and Auction
Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1855
(2008). Unless expressly stated otherwise, this Article refers to all of these options uniformly as
feed-in tariffs.
73 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 28-29.
74 Id at 19.
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maturity and generation costs." In addition, feed-in tariff design can be size-
specific in order to account for the different cost structures of utility-scale
and distributed generation. 6
Feed-in tariffs have been especially popular in Europe, pioneered by
countries like Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and Spain." Non-European
jurisdictions with feed-in tariffs to promote renewables deployment include
South Africa, Kenya, the Canadian province of Ontario, the Indian states
West Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Punjab, as well as Australia's Capital
Territory, New South Wales, and South Australia." Recently, a few
pioneering U.S. states, including California," Hawaii," Oregon," Rhode
Island,8 Vermont,' and Washington," as well as some U.S. municipalitiesm
have enacted feed-in tariff regimes.
D. Production Tax Credits
Like feed-in tariffs, production tax credits, or PTCs, are price-based
support mechanisms." In terms of remuneration, both policy instruments
appear to be two sides of the same coin." In lieu of the feed-in tariff
75 Id. at 26. For an example of cost reductions through technology learning in solar
photovoltaics and onshore wind energy see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
supra note 33, at 13.
76 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 26-27.
77 See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 92-94; see also Grinlinton & Paddock, supra
note 48, at 949 (noting that Germany's FIT laws, which were introduced in 1990, have been a
major driver behind the country's solar PV development).
78 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 90-91, 97-100, 102-07.
79 S.B. 32, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal 2009) (codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.20).
80 Order Approving FIT Tiers 1 and 2 Tariffs, Standard Agreement, and Queuing and
Interconnection Procedures, Docket No. 2008-0273 (Haw. P.U.C. 2010).
81 H.B. 3690, 75th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Or. 2010); H.B. 3039, 75th Leg., Reg, Sess. (Or. 2009);
Pilot Programs to Demonstrate the Use and Effectiveness of Volumetric Incentive Rates for
Solar Photovoltaic Energy Systems, Order No. 11-339 (Or. P.U.C. Sept. 1, 2011); Pilot Programs
to Demonstrate the Use and Effectiveness of Volumetric Incentive Rates for Solar Photovoltaic
Energy Systems, Order No. 10-198 (Or. P.U.C. May 28, 2010); Rulemaking Regarding Solar
Photovoltaic Energy Systems, Order No. 10-200 (Or. P.U.C. May 28, 2010).
82 H. 6104, Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2011).
83 H. 446, Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2009).
84 S.B. 6658, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010); S.B. 6170, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009);
S.B. 5101, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
85 For some examples of recently adopted municipal feed-in tariffs, see: Zachary Shahan,
Los Angeles Solar Feed-in Tariff Launched, CLEAN TECHNICA (Apr. 12, 2012), http://
cleantechnica.com/2012/04/12/los-angeles-solar-feed-in-tariff/ (last visited July 21, 2012); Joshua
Hill, Palo Alto Gets Feed-in Tatiff for Photovoltaics, CLEAN TECHNICA, http://cleantechnica.
com/2012/03/07/palo-alto-solar-feed-in-tariff-for-photovoltaics/ (last visited July 21, 2012);
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/02/
gainesville-solar-feed-in-tariff-a-done-deal (last visited July 21, 2012) (describing the first-ever
municipal U.S. feed-in tariff adopted in Gainesville, FL).
86 In keeping with its focus on generation-based deployment policy support, this Article
uses the terms "production tax credit" and "tax credit" interchangeably. Unless otherwise
stated, the term "tax credit" does not encompass investment tax credits.
87 Some claim that a production tax credit, "in effect, acts equivalently to a feed-in
premium." INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 101. As I will point out in greater detail later,
[Vol. 42:681694
2012] ENHANCING THE INVESTOR APPEAL OFRENEWABLE ENERGY 695
payments, production tax credit regimes reward the owner of a qualifying
power plant with tax credits for each unit of electricity output, e.g., a kWh,
generated from renewable sources." At the end of each year, the
accumulated tax credits can be used to reduce the tax liability of the
renewable energy plant owner. Like feed-in tariffs, production tax credits
are usually technology-specific, setting different reward levels for various
strands of renewable energy technologies.8
Production tax credits play a prominent part in deployment support for
renewables at the U.S. federal level, as evidenced by the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act's (ARRA's) current tax credits for qualifying plants
that generate electricity from renewables.90 Other nations that rely primarily
on tax credits to promote electricity from renewables include Finland and
Malta."' Many countries use tax credits in *tandem with other policy
instruments, such as tender regimes or RPSs."
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF DEPLOYMENT POLIcY SUCCESS
The quest for the policy that most effectively and efficiently promotes
the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies has elicited
much debate, especially among economists.93 The discussion is by no means
limited to the scholarly community; it also has a strong political dimension.
Libertarians advocate for quantity-based, market-oriented mechanisms, such
as RPSs and tender regimes, while supporters of "big government" favor
price-based mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs or tax credits.94
Comprehensive policy comparisons across a large sample of jurisdictions
are few and far between. Instead, studies tend to focus on a few select
sample jurisdictions-the "usual suspects" in the Petri dish of renewable
energy policy." A comparison across these studies to create a larger
tax credits and feed-in tariffs are, in fact, fundamentally different in their ability to promote the
deployment of renewable energy technologies. See discussion infra Part IV.
88 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 172.
89 Id at 173.
90 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
For a more detailed discussion of ARRA's tax credit provisions and previous tax credit regimes
at the U.S. federal level see BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 41.
91 Haas et al., supra note 52, at 1016.
92 Id
93 A comprehensive review of the related economic literature is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, to name but a few see STERN, supra note 30, at 347; EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra
note 13, at 9-12; Finon, supra note 71, at 117-24; Kolev & Riess, supra note 30, at 143-46; Jaffe
et al., supra note 30, at 168-73; Carolyn Fischer & Richard G. Newell, Environmental and
TechmologyPohcies for Clmate Miigation, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 142, 145-46 (2008).
94 For an instructive summary of the fierce debate over RPSs and feed-in tariffs, see, e.g,
Rickerson et al., supra note 70, at 3-4; Finon, supra note 71, at 115-16.
95 See generally Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 72 (focusing on Germany and the United
Kingdom); Lipp, supra note 17, at 5481 (focusing on Denmark, Germany and the United
Kingdom); Staffan Jacobsson et al., EU Renewable Energy Support Poliey Faith or Facts?, 37
ENERGY POL'Y 2143 (2009) (focusing on Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Belgian province
of Flanders); C. Mitchell et al., Effectiveness Through Risk Reduction: A Comparison of the
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aggregate sample of jurisdictions and policies is not only beyond the scope
of this Article, it also offers no satisfactory solution, as different studies tend
to use differing definitions and metrics for policy efficacy and efficiency."
The following discussion relies on the International Energy Agency's
(IEA) empirical review of deployment policy success in thirty-five countries
across the globe."' Following an outline of the IEA study's scope,
methodology, and metrics, I will examine its results regarding the
deployment success of policies regarding onshore wind and solar
photovoltaics." Both feature prominently among the renewable energy
technologies with the greatest potential for future deployment." Moreover,
they represent two technology strands at vastly different levels of market
maturity and cost-competitiveness:'O Under favorable conditions, onshore
wind is already cost-competitive with some fossil fuel incumbent
technologies.10 ' Solar photovoltaic technology, in turn, tends to be several
times more expensive, requiring considerably higher levels of deployment
policy support.'"
A. Scope, Methodology, and Metncs of the IEA Pohey Review
In its review of the efficacy and efficiency of deployment policies, the
IEA examined the renewable energy markets and policies of thirty OECD
member nations, as well as the five "BRICS" nations: Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa."i The study covers the period from 2000 to 2005. To
Renewable Oblgation in England and Wales and the Feed-in System in Germany, 34 ENERGY
POL'Y 297 (2006) (focusing on Germany, Wales, and England).
96 For an overview of the different schools of thought on how to measure policy efficacy,
see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 87-88.
97 See id at 85-87 (providing an overview of the "effectiveness and efficiency of deployment
policies implemented to support" renewable energy technologies).
98 Infra Parts lI.A-C. For recent trends, albeit with different and less appropriate metrics
for the purposes of this Article, see also INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: BEST
AND FUTURE POLICY PRACTICE (2011) [hereinafter INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 11].
99 See, e.g., Path to Sustainable Energy, supra note 23, at 60 (noting that about 1,700 TW of
wind capacity and 6,500 TW of solar capacity is available globally).
100 For an instructive categorization of different strands of renewable energy technologies
according to their levels of market maturity see Neuhoff, supra note 37, at 89.
101 Sonja Litthi & Thomas Prissler, Analyzing Policy Support Instruments and Regulatory
Risk Factors for Wind Energy Deployment-A Developers'Petspective, 39 ENERGY POL'Y 4876,
4876 (2011).
102 See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 13, at 15 flg.4 (providing an overview of the
production costs of electricity for different sources of energy, including projections for future
price developments based on the European Union's CASES (Cost Assessments for Sustainable
Energy Research Markets) research project). For more detail see Comm'n of the European
Communities, Energy Sources, Production Costs, and Performance of Technologies for Power
Generation, Heating and Transport, SEC (2008) 2872 (Nov. 13, 2008), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2008:2872:FIN:EN:PDF (providing
a comparative analysis of energy technologies for power generation).
103 See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 86 (examining OECD member countries
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
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account for more recent trends, results are reported both for the entire
period and, separately, for the years 2004 and 2005. Data was collected from
the Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database and with the
help of government and consultant experts. in The study includes
deployment data for onshore wind, biomass, biogas, geothermal, solar
photovoltaics, and hydroelectric power.' 5 Following the prevailing
nomenclature in the literature, policy deployment success was measured in
terms of policy efficacy and policy efficiency.'O
1. Measuring Policy Efficacy
The energy policy literature has produced a cornucopia of ways to
measure policy efficacy.'o' One approach compares the achieved results with
a pre-defined deployment target. This methodology, however, impedes
cross-country comparisons, and suffers from a bias in favor of
conservatively set targets.' A second approach focuses on the absolute
growth in renewables capacity or generation achieved over a certain period
of time. While slightly more reliable than the first approach, this
methodology fails to control for a country's size, and is therefore biased in
favor of larger countries. " Conversely, reliance on the achieved annual
growth rate of a country favors smaller countries as well as countries that
have only just entered the Race to Renewables. "'
In response to the shortcomings of the aforementioned methods to
measure policy efficacy, the IEA study relies on an efficacy indicator that
correlates annual growth with the respective country's actual renewable
energy potential."' The study's point of reference is the "realizable mid-term
potential" for renewable energy deployment by 2020 -a benchmark based
on country-specific resource availability, technology development,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the U.S.).
104 Id at 7.
105 Other technologies such as offshore wind, enhanced geothermal, wave, tidal, and marine
currents, were not included as they had not yet progressed sufficiently beyond the
demonstration phase to show significant deployment. Id. at 86.
106 Id. at 87.
107 Id. at 88-89. The following discussion draws on the overview of different methods and
indicators to measure policy efficacy.
108 Id. at 89.
109 Id
110 Id.
Ill Id. This efficacy indicator was adopted from a series of European Union research
projects. See, e.g., Comn'n of the European Communities, The Support of Electricity from
Renewable Energy Sources, SEC(2008) 57, at 9, 24, (Jan. 23, 2008), available athttp://ec.europa.
eu/energy/renewables/doc/sec_2008_57_electricity report.pdf. See generallyMARIO RAGWITZ ET
AL., INTELLIGENT ENERGY EUROPE, ASSESSMENT AND OPTIISATION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
SUPPORT SCHEMES IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MAKET, (2007), available at http://www.
optres.fhg.de/OPTRES_FINALREPORT.pdf (discussing the goals, design criteria, and
competitive framework conditions necessary to improve current renewable energy
policymaking in Europe).
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maximum market growth rates, and planning constraints.112 Controlling for
these country-specific factors allows for a more reliable comparison of
deployment success across policies and countries."
2 MeaswingPoicyEfficiency
The success of renewable energy policies depends not only on their
achieved growth in renewables deployment but, crucially, on the level of
financial support required to induce it."' A comparison of support levels
across countries helps identify the most cost-efficient policy regimes. In the
IEA study, this comparison is based on the total remuneration level."5 To
calculate normalized remuneration levels, the 2005 levels under the primary
policy regime are annualized for each investigated renewable energy
technology over a common period of twenty years."6 This approximation
comes at a price-for RPS regimes, the total remuneration level of the
electricity market price plus the average value of RECs is based on the
assumption of constant REC prices at 2005 levels;"' for feed-in tariffs, the
total remuneration is annualized accordingly if the support period is less
than twenty years."' Tariff degressions are not taken into account. The IEA
metrics for policy efficiency, therefore, should be interpreted as an
efficiency indicator rather than a calculation of actual remuneration levels.
112 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 61-62, 88.
113 See also INT'L ENERGY AGENCY II, supra note 98. This Article deliberately focuses on the
original IEA study, see supra note 7, as its methodology and metrics for policy performance are
more appropriate to measure and compare the investor appeal of policies to promote the
deployment of renewable energy technologies. Unlike the original IEA study, the follow-up
study measures policy performance by a "Policy Impact Indicator." This indicator measures the
percentage of the gap that has been closed between 2005 generation and the 2030 target
scenario for 450 ppm to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius. See
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY II, supra note 98, at 108. The "Policy Impact Indicator" carries risks
regarding the accuracy of disaggregating of regional projections to national levels. Id. at 110.
Unlike the original study's "Efficacy Indicator," the new "Policy Impact Indicator" cannot
control for country-specific variations in resource endowment. Id. at 111. These shortcomings
may be acceptable for studies that assume a macroeconomic perspective, which prioritizes
climate change mitigation through renewables at global scale. They are, however, suboptimal
when assuming this Article's microecononic, investor-oriented perspective to assess and
compare the investor appeal of competing national policies to promote renewables deployment.
Accordingly, this Article's secondary data analysis focuses on the original IEA study. See INT'L
ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7.
114 See id. at 90.
115 The IEA chose the remuneration level as a proxy to account for missing data in the
country and technology-specific generation cost profiles. See id.
116 Id at 91 (including in the annualization formula an annual discount rate of 6.5% to
determine the net present value of each country's support payments for each technology
examined in the study).
117 Id. at 90-91. See supra text accompanying notes 55-62 (describing RECs).
11s INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 91.
119 Id
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B. Policy-Based Deployment Success for Onshore Wind
The IEA evidence of deployment rates for onshore wind renewables
facilities points to feed-in tariffs as the most successful policy instruments-
in terms of both efficacy 20 and efficiency. 2'
1. Policy Efficacy
Seven of the eight nations that are grouped in the highest policy
efficacy tier used feed-in tariffs to promote the deployment of onshore wind
generation facilities.22 In fact, all but one of the countries that occupy the
IEA ranking's top two tiers relied on feed-in tariffs.123 The robustness of
these results is strengthened by a number of control events in the form of
policy changes that occurred during the reporting period. For instance,
Denmark's efficacy indicator decreased by several orders of magnitude after
the country eliminated its feed-in tariff in late 2003.124 Conversely, South
Korea and Portugal experienced significant growth in their onshore wind
deployment from 2004 to 2005, with both moving up one tier following the
adoption of new feed-in tariff regimes.2 1
Countries with RPSs fare considerably worse in the IEA ranking than
their feed-in tariff counterparts. The most successful RPS representative,
Japan, tops the third tier, ranked 9th overall.126 It should be noted that
Japan's deployment success is the product of an RPS that works in tandem
with strong investment incentives.127 The highest-ranking nation to rely
primarily on an RPS for deployment support is Italy (12th), followed by
Great Britain (13th), Belgium (15th), and the United States (16th) at the
bottom of the third tier. 28
The IEA evidence of deployment success is less conclusive for
countries that employed tender regimes. At the upper end of the spectrum,
Ireland ranks within the top tier, at 3rd overall.'2 No other nation with a
tender regime, however, has come close to replicating the Irish success.
Rather, the next highest-ranking representatives of tender regimes are India
120 Infm, Part IllB.1.
121 Infra, Part U.B.2.
122 These countries are, in order of their efficacy ranking, Germany, Spain, Denmark,
Portugal, the Netherlands, Austria, and Luxembourg. Id. at 102 tbl.4. See also INT'L ENERGY
AGENCY II, supra note 98, at 19 (noting that feed-in tariffs were significantly more effective in
stimulating deployment than RPSs and other policies).
123 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 102 tbl.4 (noting that tier one requires a policy
efficacy indicator above 7%, tier two 3%-7%'6, tier three 1%-3%, and tier four less than 1%).
124 Id. at 102 tbl.4, 104.
125 Id
126 Id. at 102 tbl.4.
127 Id at 122.
128 For the U.S., the IEA data aggregates state-level RPS deployment support with federal tax
credit deployment support. Id. at 102 tbl. 4, 106-08.
129 Id at 102 tbl.4.
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(14th) in tier three and Canada (21st) in tier four, both of which employ
tender regimes as part of a policy mix."
Evidence of deployment success induced by production tax credits is
similarly inconclusive, as most countries employed tax credits in tandem
with one or more of the aforementioned policy instruments. 3' Even with
such a policy mix, however, the most successful tax credit countries-India
(14th) and the United States (16th)-are found in tier three. Finland and
Mexico, who both rely exclusively on tax incentives to foster onshore wind
energy deployment, are ranked in tier four, at 30th and 35th, respectively.'2
2. Policy Efficiency
One of the IEA study's most interesting findings is that the most
effective deployment policies were not the ones that offered the highest
remuneration levels. While a minimum support level of $0.07 per kWh was
required for a policy to show any effect, higher remuneration levels did not
guarantee greater policy efficacy. '" The IEA data reveals feed-in tariffs as
the most cost-efficient deployment policy. Nine of the top ten feed-in tariff
representatives offered "medium" remuneration levels of $0.07-$0.12 per
kWh, including all but one of the countries ranked in tiers one and two."'
In contrast, the top four RPS nations all offered "high" remuneration levels
of more than $0.12 per kWh. Yet, the deployment success that these
countries achieved ranks them no higher than tier three. ' Again, the
evidence is less conclusive for tender regimes and tax credits.'36 Ireland, the
tender regime poster child, offered "medium" remuneration levels to place in
the top tier, as did India (14th) in tier three.'37 Canada (21st) and China
(26th) may owe their fourth tier rankings to "low" remuneration levels of
less than $0.07 per kWh. '" Remarkably, the only two representatives to rely
solely
on tax incentives-Finland (30th) and Mexico (35th)-rank near the bottom
of tier four despite offering "medium" and "high" remuneration
levels, respectively.
130 India combines tenders with a feed-in tariff and tax credits, while Canada combines
tenders with tax credits. Id
131 Id at 102-06.
132 Id at 102-03 tbl.4.
133 See id at 106.
13' Only the Netherlands, ranked 6th overall, has employed a feed-in tariff with a "high"
remuneration level. See id. at 102.
135 See id.
136 See id at 102-06.
137 See id at 102 tbl.4.
138 See id. at 102-03 tbl.4.
139 See id
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C Policy-Based Deployment Success for Solar Photovoltaics
The IEA study's evidence of deployment success for solar photovoltaic
installations is less straightforward than for onshore wind facilities.
Nonetheless, the data again points to feed-in tariffs as the policy instrument
with the highest efficacy."' In terms of cost-efficiency, 4 ' however, no policy
can claim a significant advantage over the others.
1. Policy Efficacy
Solar photovoltaic technology is considerably further from full market
maturity than onshore wind. In fact, deployment efforts in many countries
still focus on the technology demonstration stage.14 2 As a result, the IEA
study's overall policy efficacy indicator for solar photovoltaics is over ten
times lower than for onshore wind.1 n Four of the five most successful
countries relied on feed-in tariffs to promote the deployment of solar
photovoltaic facilities for electricity generation." The competitive edge of
the top three feed-in tariff representatives is all the more impressive, as their
policy efficacy exceeds that of the following nations by a factor of ten.45
The spread in deployment success for countries relying on RPSs is
more pronounced in solar photovoltaics than for onshore wind. In fact,
Japan ranks third overall and within tier one, breaking the phalanx of feed-in
tariff representatives. 4 1 It should be noted, however, that RPS support can
only claim partial credit for the Japanese deployment success, as the RPS is
complemented by strong investment incentives covering up to 50% of project
costs. "' Sweden and Poland, who both relied exclusively on RPSs, have been
rather ineffective at promoting solar photovoltaics deployment, placing in
tier four at 24th and 33rd, respectively. 48
Countries relying on tax credits achieved limited deployment success at
best. Leading the pack, India ranks 9th at the bottom of tier three. 4 9 All other
tax credit representatives are ranked within tier four. Finally, none of the
140 Infra, Part I.C.1.
141 Infra, Part III.C.2.
142 See, e.g., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 125 (noting IEA evidence of solar
photovoltaics deployment in China).
143 Id at 122. Accordingly, the IEA study's first tier requires an efficacy indicator of over
0.5%, 0.29-0.5% for tier two, 0.059%6-0.2% for tier three, and less than 0.05% for tier four.
See id. at 124 tbl.8.
144 See id. at 123. The dominant feed-in tariff candidates are, in order of their IEA efficacy
ranking, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Interestingly, far
more nations relied on feed-in tariffs to promote deployment of solar photovoltaics than for
onshore wind.
145 See id. This gap is, in fact, so significant that, over the entire period of 2000-2005, no
other nation has made it even into tier two of the IEA ranking. See id. at 125-27; see aLso INT'L
ENERGY AGENCY II, supra note 97, at 20 (noting for solar photovoltaics deployment that "nearly
all countries with growing markets have used FITs").
146 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 123.
147 See id at 122.
1 See id. at 124 tbl.8.
149 See id. at 123 tbl.8.
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thirty-five countries included in the IEA study employed tender regimes to
promote the deployment of solar photovoltaics facilities."50
2. Pobicy Efficiency
The generation costs of solar photovoltaic projects are significantly
higher than for onshore wind turbines."' As a result, the correlation between
remuneration levels and policy efficacy is stronger. No country was able to
achieve significant deployment success offering "low" levels of
remuneration of less than $0.10 per kWh.152 At the other end of the spectrum,
the three most successful nations-two feed-in tariff representatives and
one RPS country-all offered "high" remuneration levels of over $0.30 per
kWh. 53 The three tax credit representatives in the IEA study also performed
according to the "medium" level of remuneration they offered, i.e., $0.10-
$0.30 per kWh, ranking in midfield at the bottom of tier three and the top of
tier four.m IThere are, however, some exceptions to this correlation between
deployment success and remuneration levels. Using a feed-in tariff,
Switzerland was the only country to place in tier one, despite offering only a
"medium" level of remuneration. ' A look at the other end of the policy
performance spectrum, however, suggests caution in interpreting the Swiss
example as conclusive proof of feed-in tariffs' greater cost-efficiency in the
context of solar photovoltaics. After all, no less than five feed-in tariff
nations placed poorly-in tier four-despite offering "high" levels of
remuneration." The lEA evidence, therefore, does not support strong claims
that any one policy has proven to be more cost-efficient than another at
promoting deployment of solar photovoltaic technology.
D. Quantitative Answers and Qualitative Questions
The lEA study of deployment success across countries and policies
yields a number of insights-some expected, others less so. Among the
former is the need for a minimum level of remuneration to induce any
significant deployment at all. The comparison between onshore wind and
solar photovoltaics illustrates that the minimal support level is technology-
specific, based on the respective technology's cost characteristics and its
market maturity.'5 7
150 See id at 123-24 tbl.8.
151 See id. at 121.
152 Id. at 123-24 tbl.8.
153 Id. at 122-26 (noting the high efficacy levels of Luxembourg and Germany-which both
use feed-in tariffs-and Japan, an RPS country).
154 Tax credit countries include India (9th), South Africa (12th), and Mexico (14th). See id. at
123 tbl.S.
155 While Switzerland did complement its feed-in tariff with investment incentives, the
combined level of the two was still "medium." See id.
156 These countries are Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, and Greece. See id at 123-24 tbl.8.
157 See id. at 121-27.
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Another, less obvious insight is that onshore wind and photovoltaic
technologies appear to differ not only in the absolute levels of policy
remuneration they require, but also in the relative importance of said
remuneration for their overall deployment success. With few exceptions,
deployment success for solar power correlated strongly with the
remuneration offered, independent of whether it was under an RPS, tender
regime, feed-in tariff, or tax incentives.'8 In contrast, deployment success
for onshore wind technology correlated much less strongly with the level of
remuneration offered." The IEA data, therefore, suggests that remuneration
levels are of greater relative importance for less mature technologies, such
as solar photovoltaics, to the point of drowning out other factors in the
deployment equation. As costs come down, however, and technologies
approach market maturity-and, with it, grid parity-deployment factors
beyond policy remuneration appear to gain in relative importance. The IEA
notes that for onshore wind deployment, "higher remuneration levels do not
appear to yield greater levels of policy effectiveness."'60 Rather, the same
financial incentives brought forth vastly different deployment success across
the examined policies, pointing to forces at play other than technology-
specific generation costs or remuneration levels alone. For instance, the top
three feed-in tariff countries achieved four times the deployment success of
the top three RPS countries-at half the cost.'6' Figure 1 illustrates this
observation.





8 - E Effectiveness Indicator




0 (U.S. cent/ kWh)0
Figure 1. Onshore Wind Deployment of Top 3 FIT and RPS Countries (2004-05)162
158 See id.; see also supra Part 1H. C.2.
159 See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 102; see also supra Part m.B.2.
160 See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 101.
161 Id. at 106 fig.3.
162 Based on INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 106 fig.3.
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With more and more renewable energy technologies following onshore
wind toward grid parity, factors beyond the technology-specific cost of
generation are gaining ever-greater importance. If we can identify these
factors, they will allow us to find an explanation for the surprising
disconnect between remuneration levels and deployment success as
observed in the IEA study. More importantly, if we understand how public
policy can shape these factors to better promote renewable energy
technologies, then we can design better, more cost-effective deployment
policies going forward. In other words, we will be able to enhance the
investor appeal of renewable energy as the industry comes of age.
IV. "SOr-CosT" FACTORS-A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY EVALUATION
Ultimately, the long-term success of any policy to promote renewables
deployment depends on its ability to leverage private-sector investment.
But, remarkably, existing scholarship has by and large failed to assess these
policies from an investor's point of view."' The multi-trillion dollar challenge
to scale-up renewable energy technologies and to decarbonize the energy
sector is too great and too costly for the public sector to shoulder alone. "
At the same time, the private sector is wary to assume the enormous
technological and other risks associated with energy innovation, especially
where electricity rate regulation imposes limitations on the expected return
on investment. " It is crucial, therefore, that public policy to deploy
renewables be designed with an investor's perspective in mind. Whether
business angels, venture capitalists, private equity funds, utilities,
corporations, businesses, or households choose to invest in renewable
energy technologies depends on the profit they expect from
their investment.
The relatively weak correlation between remuneration levels and policy
efficacy for onshore wind suggests that investors do not judge a policy's
attractiveness solely by the face value of its financial incentives.67 A recent
survey among European and U.S. wind energy project developers confirms
this intuition and offers some insight into the factors that influence
investment decisions in renewable energy technologies.'1 For instance, the
l6 See Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 4246 at 1420-21 ("Energy investment,
especially renewable energy investment, is expensive and moves slowly. Mild nudges are not
likely to have any discernible effect.").
164 For two rare exceptions with surveys and interviews of clean-tech investors, see Liuthi &
Prissler, supra note 101, at 4878; Buirer & Wilstenhagen, supra note 14, 4999-5000.
165 See, e.g., Path to Sustainable Energy, supra note 23, at 64 (quoting a 100 trillion dollar
cost for the transition to renewables, not counting necessary investments in transmission
infrastructure).
166 SeeMormann, supra note 31, at 917-19.
167 SeeINT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 101.
168 Lithi & Prissler, supra note 101. The survey does not, however, offer an exhaustive
evaluation of the factors that guide energy project developers in their investment decisions. The
structured interviews were limited to six topics: administrative process, legal security, grid
access, remuneration, credit financing, and cash grants. Id. at 4878, 4879 tbl.2.
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surveyed developers indicated a high priority for streamlined administrative
processes and grid access regulation that favors renewable energy
technologies. Favorable grid access regulation was particularly important
to U.S. developers. 0
The survey results confirm recent legal scholarship on barriers to
renewables deployment that do not relate directly to technology-specific
generation costs.' 7' In particular, barriers related to the electricity market
and its regulation, administrative barriers, and issues of social acceptance
represent significant obstacles in the Race to Renewables.'7 1 Some of these
obstacles, such as permit procedures, are beyond the immediate scope of
deployment policies and require separate regulatory action.'73 Others,
however, are impacted-sometimes more, sometimes less directly-by the
design characteristics of policies to deploy renewable energy technologies.1
Deployment policies with a positive impact on these "soft-cost" factors
promise to be effective without the need to offer excessively high
remuneration. Conversely, policies that ignore "soft-cost" factors or have an
adverse effect on them are likely to achieve limited deployment success,
absent very high levels of remuneration. Based on the relevant literature,
surveys, and my own scholarship and experience as an advisor to clean-tech
investors, I have compiled a set of "soft-cost" factors that can guide the
evaluation of existing policies and help design better policies for the
future.' 5 These "soft-cost" factors can be categorized into investment-based
factors," market-based factors, ' and behavioral factors related to
social acceptance.
A. Investment-Based Factors
The face value of a deployment policy's remuneration level is an
essential, but by no means the only, investment-based factor that determines
whether a private, profit-oriented party will invest in electricity generation
from renewable sources of energy. Other key factors include investment
certainty, associated transaction costs, and the range of potential investors
and investment opportunities.
Investment certainty determines the amount and longevity of expected
cash flows. Accordingly, it is of critical importance to the net present-value
169 Id. at 4883, 4888 figs. 9 & 10, 4889.
170 Id. at 4890.
171 Mormann, supra note 31, at 921-28.
172 Id
173 See generally id (providing reform suggestions in the realm of regulatory matters).
174 See also INT'L ENERGY AGENCY II, supra note 98, at 19 (noting "the importance of other
factors, e.g. the overall level of investor confidence engendered by the whole policy portfolio").
175 This compilation neither claims nor intends to be exhaustive. Rather, it is designed to
frame and inspire a new approach to deployment policy evaluation and design, which extends
beyond remuneration levels and other traditional metrics.
176 lfra, Part W.A.
177 lAfra, Part I.B.
178 Infra, Part IV.C.
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calculations that precede all large-scale investment decisions.'79 Renewable
energy deployment policies can affect investment certainty in two ways.
From an inter-policy perspective, the longevity and stability of a policy
determine investor confidence in its continued availability.'" The greater the
(perceived) likelihood of a policy's modification, elimination, or replacement
by another less favorable policy, the more reluctant investors will be to fund
renewable energy projects." From an intra-policy perspective, investors
require reasonable certainty of the remuneration they can expect while the
respective policy is in place.'" Market-based policies that are subject to
fluctuating market conditions, for instance, may score lower in terms of
intra-policy certainty than price-based policies, which guarantee
compensation at predetermined levels.
Investment in facilities that generate electricity from renewable energy
sources is accompanied by a whole plethora of individual transactions,
including siting and feasibility studies, permit procedures, financing, land
leases, etc.18 Most of these transactions and their associated costs occur
equally under all deployment policies.'" However, transactions and related
costs that determine eligibility to receive policy support or to monetize that
support are policy-sensitive. The share of these transaction costs in the
overall cost of the project will co-determine the investor appeal of policies
for the deployment of renewable energy technologies.
The range of potential investors and investment opportunities that a
deployment policy addresses is crucial for its success. The more diverse the
pool of investors, the greater the available capital will be that a policy can
leverage." Increased competition among investors also tends to drive down
179 See, e.g., ANDREW METRICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 31-32
(2007); see also Christopher B. Berendt, A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid National
Market for Renewable Energy Certificates: The REC-EX Model, 19 ELEc. J., June 2006, at 54-55
("lIt is essential that renewable energy investors have reliable information regarding the levels
of return from the start of the financing process."); KIRSTY HAMILTON, UNLOCKING FINANCE FOR
CLEAN ENERGY: THE NEED FOR 'INVESTMENT GRADE' POLICY 10 (2009), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109217; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY II, supra
note 98, at 18 (noting that "even where RE technologies could be competitive, deployment can
be delayed or prevented by barriers related to, for example, regulatory and policy uncertainty").
180 HAMILTON, supra note 179, at 13, 26-27.
181 See id. (providing a general discussion of the importance of policy continuity for
investment in renewable energy innovation); Neuhoff, supra note 37, at 103-05; STERN, supra
note 30, at 352, 354-58; Jaffe et al., supra note 30, at 169.
182 See Jaffe et al., supra note 30, at 167-68; LUithi & Prissler, supra note 100, at 4889;
Neuhoff, supra note 37, at 105. See also UDAY VARADARAJAN ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF POLICY ON
THE FINANCING OF RENEWABLE PROJECTS: A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 15-16 (2011) (noting that
duration of revenue support and revenue certainty are the two most important factors in
reducing the cost of financing renewable energy projects).
183 For an overview of the necessary financial transactions see Braden W. Penhoet,
Financing Structures and Transactions, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND
RENEWABLES 241, 241-57 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).
18 See id. at 241-42.
185 See Penhoet, supra note 183, at 241-57 (describing the diversity of investments required
to fund renewable energy projects).
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overall project costs.'" In addition, a larger pool of investors tends to
broaden the support-base for -renewable energy projects and, hence,
promote their local acceptance. What types of investors a policy appeals to
depends, in part, on its level of investment certainty and associated
transaction costs. Other important factors include the variety of technology
strands and plant sizes encompassed in the deployment policy.
B. Market-Based Factors
The electricity market and its complex regulatory framework play an
important part in the due diligence of any investor who contemplates
funding the deployment of renewable energy technologies. As one
commentator put it: "[T]he success of renewable energy deployment does
not only depend on the design of the support policies but also on the
electricity market design and the interaction of both fields of regulation."
Key factors include how regulators answer questions related to grid access,
dispatch priority, and the level of risk exposure to the electricity market's
forecast and balancing obligations.
Except for the rare scenario in which a renewable electricity generator
can sell all of its output directly (e.g., to a local industrial plant), access to
the electricity grid is indispensable. While this physical requirement holds
true under all deployment policies, they vary considerably in the way they
address the two key questions surrounding grid access regulation: the
strength of a renewable electricity generator's right to be connected to the
grid, and how the related costs are allocated between the renewables plant
and the local network operator. Connection costs can reach up to a quarter
of the overall investment costs. 8 Accordingly, the regulatory allocation of
these costs is almost as important to an investor's profit expectations as his
grid access right.
Mere connection to the grid does not guarantee renewable energy
generators that they will actually be able to sell all of the electricity that they
generate. At present, the U.S. market is characterized by an oversupply of
generation capacity, especially during off-peak times."' A plant's ability to
186 See Jaffe et al., supra note 30, at 167 (positing that competition drives prices down and
benefits consumers).
187 See Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Op-Ed., How to Make Renewable Energy
Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2012, http://nyti.ms/LmGDI7 (last visited July 19, 2012)
(discussing the critical importance of broadening the pool of available capital to lower the cost
of financing renewable energy and democratize America's energy future).
188 Corinna Klessmann et al., Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market
Risks-A Comparison of the Market Integration Approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UI 36
ENERGY POL'Y 3646, 3646 (2008).
189 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 31. For an overview of connection costs relative to
overall investment cost across a wide array of renewable energy technologies, see id., at 31-33.
190 This market characteristic is especially relevant for wind energy plants as their wind-
dependent output tends to be strongest at night when electricity demand is relatively low. See,
eg, California ISO, Daily Renewables Watch, http://www.caiso.conVgreen/renewableswatch.
html (last visited July 21, 2012).
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sell its electricity, therefore, depends on its dispatch priority-i.e., how high
it ranks in the order of plants that are called upon (dispatched) to feed their
electricity into the grid.'' Most jurisdictions in the United States do not
guarantee dispatch priority to electricity generators that rely on renewable
energy technologies."' In Texas, for instance, the dispatch-related
curtailment of electricity from wind turbines reached a record 17% of
potential wind energy generation in 2009. ' Simply put, one out of six kWh
of available electricity from wind energy was wasted. From an investor's
perspective, dispatch priority is closely related to intra-policy certainty, as
curtailment directly affects generation-based remuneration. Without
dispatch priority, output curtailment severely reduces the profitability and,
therefore, the attractiveness of renewable energy technology investment.'
Recognizing the crucial role of dispatch priority for the large-scale
deploymeit of renewable energy technologies, the European Union recently
passed legislation that requires all of its member states to ensure dispatch
priority for electricity from renewable sources of energy.'
Many of the most promising renewable energy technologies, such as
those relying on solar or wind energy, depend on favorable meteorological
conditions to generate electricity. The resulting intermittency of their output
presents a serious challenge to network operators. To help dispatch
planning and ensure a stable supply of electricity, generators are usually
required to sell their power in forward markets, e.g., through bids to supply
power for five-minute intervals on a day-ahead basis."' If a generator fails to
deliver the contracted-for amount of electricity, it has to compensate the
system operator under their balancing services agreement, in order to cover
for the generator's lack of performance. The cost of these balancing services
varies depending on the time period covered, how much advance notice is
given, and the balancing market's liquidity.'97 In some cases, balancing costs
may significantly exceed the generator's sales price for electricity.""
Accordingly, the level of exposure to the electricity mnarket's forecast and
balancing obligations can have an enormous impact on the profitability of
renewable energy plants. Moreover, a strict forecast and balancing regime
191 For an illustrative overview of the processes behind dispatch and balancing see
Klessmann et al., supra note 188, at 3647-49; see also FoX-PENNER, supra note 36, at 26-27;
Rossi, supra note 48, at 1439.
192 Liuthi & Prissler, supra note 100, at 4887.
193 RYAN WISER & MARK BOLINGER, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2009 WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET
REPORT 50(2010).
194 Klessmann et al., supra note 188, at 3651 (pointing to uncertainty as the main
predicament for investors in renewable electricity (RES-E)): "The insecurity introduced by the
fact that the rate of curtailment is difficult to predict for RES-E opersitors might be considered
more significant than the actual losses of income." Id.
195 See Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources, supra note 49, at art. 16.
196 For an introduction to the architecture of the electricity market see Klessmann et al.,
supra note 180, at 3647-48.
197 Id
198 See id. at 3653 (noting that "system-buy and system-sell prices are very volatile and
sometimes take values tens of times larger than their average").
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imposes a particularly heavy burden on smaller and independent power
generators who cannot balance their supply with other elements of a utility's
broad portfolio of generation technologies. '9 A deployment policy's capacity
to shield renewable energy plants from these obligations, therefore, is
essential for its appeal to investors and its ability to drive the large-scale
deployment of renewable energy technologies.
C Behavioral Factors
Behavioral factors for investors and policymakers to consider revolve
around issues related to the social acceptance of renewable energy
technologies. Conflicts over local acceptance are among the most commonly
cited non-economic barriers to deployment.o Local opposition to the siting
and construction of renewables plants does not always match national or
global concerns over climate change and energy security.o20
The growing "Not-In-My-Backyard" (NIMBY) mentality among
American communities can cause costly delays to renewable energy
projects, as illustrated by the recent opposition to wind power projects in
Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the Nantucket Sound. 20 2 Spatial planning
and local zoning regulation effectively enable communities to delay or even
prevent the deployment of wind turbines and other renewables plants of
disputed aesthetic value.203 Wisconsin recently estimated that over 600 MW
of proposed wind projects had been stalled by local permit requirements
that the state authorities considered unduly burdensome .2 ' In response, the
state legislature enacted new statewide standards for siting wind projects.2 0
These standards aim to preempt local permit regulations to the extent that
they are more restrictive than the Wisconsin Public Service Commission
199 Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 72, at 16-17.
200 See, e.g, STERN, supra note 30, at 369; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 7, at 85-86, 100,
175; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 33, at 24-25; Neuhoff, supra
note 37, at 96; Duane, supra note 48 at 775-76; Luithi & Prassler, supra note 100, at 4890. See also
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY II, supra note 98, at 18 ("Sustainability and social acceptance can also be
critical issues for some technologies.").
201 See, e.g, Mortenson, supra note 68, at 203 ("[S]ome local and regional zoning efforts have
been accused of taking too many local interests into consideration.").
202 For details on local zoning efforts against wind development in Wyoming, the protracted
conflict over wind power projects in the Nantucket Sound, and debates over the aesthetics of
ridgeline wind projects in Vermont, see Duane, supra note 48, at 775-76. See also Kari Lydersen,
Wisconsin Feels Turbulence Over Pulling Po wer From Air, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 2008, at A02.
203 For an illustrative summary of the perceived nuisances related to wind turbines see
Mortenson, supra note 67, at 189-92.
204 Jeffery S. Dennis et al., Report of the Renewable Energy & Demand-Side Management
Committee, 31 ENERGY L.J. 287, 300 (2010).
205 2009 Wis. Act 40, 2009-2010 Wisc. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 66.0401(1)(m)(2010)). The controversy over wind energy siting is illustrated by the fact that
the Wisconsin legislation was temporarily suspended in March of 2011, and not reinstated until
March 2012, see Press Release, Clean Wisconsin, Statewide Wind Siting Rules Go Back into
Effect (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.cleanwisconsin.org/index.php?module=cms&page=580 (last
visited July 21, 2012).
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standards. In the absence of such strong state mandates, issues related to
the social acceptance of renewable energy technologies continue to
influence local permit processes.
Short of active opposition, sheer passivity among local planners is
enough to diminish the investor appeal of renewable energy. Many American
communities fail to include renewable energy technologies in their spatial
planning. 207 Outdated zoning ordinances may treat solar rooftop installations
and other micro-generation from renewable energy the same as a large-scale
nuclear power plant.20s The resulting long lead times for renewables plant
deployment raise overall investment costs. How deployment policies affect
the public perception and acceptance of renewable energy technologies,
therefore, determines their ability to leverage the investments necessary to
drive the transition to a renewables-based electricity sector. Figure 2
summarizes the framework of investment-based, market-based and
behavioral "soft-cost" factors that this Article proposes to guide the analysis




A. Investment-based Transaction cost
factors Size
Range of opportunities Technology
Investor
Grid access
B. Market-based factors Dispatch priority
Forecast and balancing
Spatial planning
C. Behavioral factors Social acceptance Permitting
NIMBY
Figure 2. "Soft-Cost" Factor Framework for Deployment Policy Analysis
206 See Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New 1rontier: Clmate Change, Natural
Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 117-18 (2011) ("[T]he
scale of wind projects themselves as well as the state-wide concerns associated with wind-
related environmental and siting challenges argue in favor of a greater emphasis on a state-wide
system of permitting for large wind projects than is the case for solar projects on private
lands.").
207 Megan Lewis et al., The Role of Planning in the New Energy Er, PAS MEMO (Am.
Planning Assoc./Planning Advisory Serv.), Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 1, 9. '
208 A prominent example of the need to adjust spatial planning to the needs and benefits of
distributed generation from renewable sources of energy involves climate change combatant Al
Gore whose plans to install solar panels on his roof were stalled by the local zoning ordinance.
See George Homsy, Earth, Wind, and fire, PLANNING Aug.-Sept. 2007, at 46, 46-47.
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V. A "SoFr-COST" FACTOR ANALYSIS OF DEPLOYMENT POLICIES
The following qualitative analysis rates and compares the conceptual
capacity of various deployment policies to influence "soft-cost" factors in a
way that spurs investment in renewable energy technologies. To facilitate
comparisons across policies and factors, qualitative ratings range from
"poor" to "moderate" to "good" to "excellent." Sections A, B, and C of this
Part address feed-in tariffs, RPSs, tax credits, and tender regimes in the
reverse order of their favorable impact on the "soft-cost" factors that co-
determine an investor's decision to fund renewables projects. Only the
summary in section D discusses the four policies in their positive
merit order.
A. Pobcy Impact on Investment-Based Factors
Topping the list of investment-based "soft-cost" factors considered by
renewable energy investors is the certainty with which they can expect to
make a profit on their investments.209 Another important variable in these
profit calculations is the anticipated transaction costs the investment would
incur.1 o Finally, the range of investors and investment opportunities that a
deployment policy addresses defines the size of the capital pool that it may
draw from. 211
1. Investment Certainty
Tender regimes beckon renewable energy investors with excellent
intra-policy certainty. The reverse auction's winning bidder is awarded a
long-term power purchase agreement based on its bid price. 212 That price is
guaranteed for the entire term of the agreement, for example over fifteen
years under the British Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation.21 3 Inter-policy certainty,
however, is poor. Tenders represent singular events that are announced at
random, unpredictable intervals and, as a result, afford renewable energy
investors little to no planning certainty.214 Even if they are ready and willing
to compete with other bidders, investors rarely know when or where the
next tender will be announced far enough in advance to adjust their
investment strategy accordingly. Finally, the cap inherent in the overall
capacity set out in every tender process deters additional investment.
Production tax credit regimes offer good intra-policy certainty to
investors. They guarantee a stable cash flow, albeit in terms of "negative
209 See infra Part V.A.1.
210 See infra Part V.A.2.
211 See infra Part V.A.3.
212 See supra Part H.B.
213 For a sample discussion of the tender regime under the British Non-Fossil Fuel
Obligation see Niels I. Meyer, European Schemes for Promoting Renewables in Liberaised
Markets, 31 ENERGY POL'Y 665, 668 (2003).
214 Id. at 669; Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 72, at 1863 (noting the "long and unpredictable
time lags" between auctions).
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costs" for every unit of electricity produced over their entire duration. To
reap the full benefits of the accruing tax credits, however, investors must
have sufficient tax liability or, simply put, hefty tax bills to offset.2" This
dependence of the actual reward-value on the investors' tax liability reduces
the overall intra-policy certainty offered by tax credit regimes. The inter-
policy investment certainty of tax credif regimes is moderate. As a result of
their immediate budget relevance, tax policies are prone to frequent
modification or even elimination, e.g., due to changes in government or
budget austerity measures. The short timeframes and intermittency of tax
credit support for renewables at the U.S. federal level illustrate these
shortcomings."
In contrast, RPS regimes induce an excellent level of inter-policy
certainty among investors. RPSs rely on the market-i.e., the buyers of
RECs-to provide the necessary remuneration to promote renewables
deployment.2 " Hence, RPS policies do not (directly) burden state budgets
and, consequently, are less prone to modification or elimination in times of
budget austerity. 21 8 Their market reliance, however, causes RPSs to perform
poorly in terms of intra-policy certainty. Sophisticated RPS design can
suggest an upper boundary for REC trading prices by setting a penalty that
utilities must pay for every REC they should-but fail-to procure. 219 This
"buy-out" price may set a price ceiling but it does not establish a price floor.
Consequently, a renewable power investor's revenue from REC sales is left
to fluctuate according to the market's invisible hand, with regulatory
limitations on its upside potential but not on its downside potential. 2 20 And
the emerging-often fragmented and, hence, illiquid-nature of REC
markets makes them difficult to predict for investors. Finally, the inherent
cap in the capacity-targets set by RPS regimes further undermines their
intra-policy certainty.22'
By comparison, feed-in tariffs offer the highest overall level of certainty
to investors in renewable energy technologies. Their excellent inter-policy
certainty benefits from their budget independence. Since the costs of
215 See supra Part II.D.
216 See, e.g, MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 172-73; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7,
at 108; Mortenson, supra note 68, at 183. See also JESSE JENKINS ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., Beyond
Boom & Bust - Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy Independence, 37 (2012), (noting that
the federal production tax credit regime for wind power "was first enacted in 1992, but has
since expired three times, and has been renewed a total of seven times, often with less than a
month to spare before pending expiration").
217 See supra Part II.A.
218 See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 46, at 109.
219 Consider, for example, the United Kingdom's penalty design under its Renewables
Obligation, in which suppliers of electricity who do not hold sufficient RECs are required to pay
a penalty into a buy-out fund. The proceeds from this fund are then distributed among the
suppliers who have complied with their RPS obligations. Klessmann et al., supra note 180,
at 3653.
220 See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 24-25.
221 The investment uncertainties associated with RPS policies are commonly blamed for
their poor cost-efficiency compared to other deployment policies, as investors require a high
risk premium. See id. at 101.
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supporting renewables are distributed across all ratepayers, feed-in tariffs
are less likely to be curtailed or eliminated due to state budget austerity, as
compared to tax credit policies. Moreover, feed-in tariffs offer excellent
intra-policy certainty. In duration, tariff payments are guaranteed for
timeframes that approach or exceed most power purchase agreements
awarded under tender regimes.2m Unlike under RPS or tax credit regimes,
investor cash flows from a fixed-rate feed-in tariff are not subject to the
fluctuations of the electricity market and-in the case of RPSs-the REC
market. Finally, the actual reward value of feed-in tariff payments does not
depend on extrinsic factors such as the investor's tax liability, as is required
for tax policies.
2 Transaction Costs
RPS regimes perform poorly, as they incur the greatest transaction
costs of any deployment policy. Electricity generators that rely on renewable
sources of energy are required to negotiate and execute one or multiple
power purchase agreements to sell the electricity they generate.223 But the
market rates offered under these agreements are unlikely to cover the
renewable power sellers' generation costs. To close this gap, the renewables
generators need to sell the RECs they receive for their electricity, often on a
separate market, thus incurring additional transaction costs. Inclusion of
RECs under the original power purchase agreements can help reduce overall
transaction costs somewhat. However, legal uncertainty and inconsistent
judicial treatment of REC ownership and entitlement across states threaten
to further drive up transaction costs. 24
Production tax credits fare moderately well regarding remuneration-
related transaction costs. Like RPSs, tax credit regimes require renewable
electricity generators to negotiate and execute their own power purchase
agreements and bear the associated costs. Unlike with an RPS, tax credit
benefits accrue automatically without the need for further trading.2 5 To reap
the full value of these benefits, however, may require a complex and costly
investment structure to ensure sufficient tax liability, or tax equity, to offset
the tax credits. Accordingly, a recent comparison of ARRA's tax credits and
its section 1603 cash grant equivalent identified the scarcity of available
tax equity and the resulting high costs of investment structures with outside
222 For an overview of the guaranteed terms of payment under a variety of feed-in tariff
regimes, see Haas et al., supra note 52, at 1017-18 tbl.3.
223 For an insight into the complexity of power purchase agreements see Jeremy D.
Weinstein, Contract Techniques for Renewable Resource Power Purchase Agreement Offtakers,
in ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT FINANCE LAW AND TAXATION: NEW INVESTMENT
TECHNIQUES 493-520 (Andrea S. Kramer & Peter C. Fusaro eds., 2010).
224 For a summary of the inconsistent court rulings on REC entitlement and the resulting
misalignment of RPS deployment incentives see Davies, supra note 44, at 1378, 1410-15.
225 U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FACT SHEET: SOLAR
ENERGY INVESTMENT TAX CREDITS AND GRANTS 1 (2011).
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tax equity as major deterrents to greater renewables investment in the
United States.""
Tender regimes offer moderate transaction-cost efficiency similar to tax
policies, albeit for different reasons. In contrast to tax credits or RPSs,
tender regimes do not require the successful bidder to negotiate and execute
a power purchase agreement and bear the related costs. Rather, the winning
bid is automatically rewarded with a corresponding contract. 2 7 To win the
bidding contest, however, requires substantial and costly preparation and
calculation of different cost scenarios. Similar calculations and resulting
costs are required under any other deployment policy. Yet, this Article
attributes greater relative value to them under tender regimes because every
tender carries the risk that a losing bidder's incurred costs will end up as a
sunk investment. As one commentator put it: "[T]here is no certainty of
success for an application, which means the developer runs the risk of
wasted development costs."2 28
In comparison, feed-in tariffs offer excellent transaction-cost efficiency,
as they impose the lowest transaction costs on investors in order to reap the
deployment policy's full rewards. The feed-in tariff requires the local utility
to execute a power purchase agreement based on standard terms that
guarantee the full tariff payment. This "one-stop-shopping" design relieves
investors of the burden and cost of contractual negotiations. It is up to the
local utility in cooperation with other network operators to recover the cost
229of the feed-in tariff by passing it on to all of their ratepayers.
3 Range of Potential Investors and Investment Opportunities
Tender regimes do poorly in the range of investors they speak to. The
high up-front cost to prepare a competitive bid, and the uncertainty of its
eventual payoff, discourage the vast majority of potential investors. Only
institutional investors or incumbent utilities-who possess sufficient
overhead capacity and industry-specific knowledge-tend to be willing to
assume the risk of preparing and submitting a costly but ultimately
unsuccessful bid.230 The tender process is "a bureaucratic process with
several application deadlines which create busy periods for those
involved ... and therefore staffing and time management problems."231
226 See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 41, at 11. See also Mormann & Reicher, supra
note 187.
227 See supra Part H.B.
228 Catherine Mitchell, The Renewables NFFO.A Review, 23 ENERGY POL'Y 1077, 1086 (1995).
229 For an instructive overview of the flows of capital for the cost recovery under feed-in
tariff regimes see MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at xxii fig. 0. 1.
230 In fact, the harsh competition under tender regimes has led some investors to place bids
that, upon winning the tender, proved too low to implement and operate the renewables project
at a profit. As a result, many of these investors abandoned their projects and let their bidding
special purpose vehicle file for bankruptcy to avoid paying a default penalty or other financial
responsibility for their lack of performance under the tender contract. See id. at 174-75; Butler
& Neuhoff, supra note 72, at 1859.
231 Mitchell, supra note 228, at 1086.
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Tender regimes demonstrate a moderate capacity to promote a range of
investment opportunities. They are inherently technology-specific, inviting
bids to supply electricity from a specified strand of renewable energy
technology (e.g., offshore wind).232 However, tender regimes generally focus
on large, utility-scale plants. As a result, they fail to harness the huge
potential of renewable energy technologies for use in distributed generation
applications that promise greater system reliability while requiring little to
no investment in new transmission infrastructure.23
RPS policies have moderate potential to mobilize a wider range of
investors than tender regimes, but the overall investor appeal of RPSs
suffers from their low intra-policy certainty and relatively high transaction
costs. Both tend to discourage small-scale investors as well as capital-
sources that lack the industry-specific experience necessary to master the
challenges of REC trading. Accordingly, investors often criticize RPSs as
"big corporation policies" with "neutral or negative effects on smaller,
entrepreneurial firms."" RPS policies' general lack of appeal to small-scale
investors severely reduces their promotional impact on households,
businesses, and other distributed generation applications for renewable
energy technologies.15 To date, most RPS regimes are technology-neutral
and, consequently, favor the current least-cost renewables technologies-
such as onshore wind and biomass-at the expense of emerging
technologies like solar photovoltaics or advanced geothermal.2 36 RPSs are,
however, not completely incompatible with technology-specific sourcing
mandates. The RPS regimes of Colorado and New Jersey, for instance,
require that a certain portion of the utilities' overall sourcing quota for
renewables be supplied from solar technologies. 3 1 One caveat to these so-
called carve-outs and their use in designing technology-specific RPS policies
is that carve-outs tend to foster fragmented, and therefore less efficient, REC
232 A leading renewables country to employ tender regimes for the deployment of offshore
wind energy farms is Denmark. Haas et al., supra note 52, at 1017 tbl.3.
233 A recent proposal by California's Governor Jerry Brown to install 12,000 MW worth of
distributed generation capacity from renewables illustrates the importance of small-scale
generation facilities. See Luskin Center for Innovation, Local Energy Generation Resources: A
Worldng Conference (July 25-26), http://luskin.ucla.edu/events/local-energy-generation-
resources-working-conference (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); see also Fox-PENNER, supra note 36, at
109 (noting that "capacity planners ... need to distinguish between large- and small-scale
renewable, or, equivalently, centralized and distributed generation"). The avoidance of new
transmission construction is especially important at a time when courts curtail FERC backstop
transmission jurisdiction. See Fershee, MovingPowerForward, supra note 46, at 1418.
234 Birer & WVistenhagen, supra note 14, at 5005.
235 With the exception of hydroelectric facilities, RPS policies do not usually include size-
specific provisions. In the hydro context, such provisions primarily serve to exclude existing
large-scale hydro plants from inclusion under RPS mandates. See Davies, supra note 44, at 1377.
236 See MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 153.
237 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124 (2004); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-2.3 (2010). For a detailed
discussion of solar carve-outs and their deployment effects see JASON COUGHLIN & KARLYNN
CORY, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL-TP-6A2-44853, SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC FINANCING:
RESIDENTIAL SECTOR DEPLOYMENT (2009).
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markets.'" An alternative option that avoids market proliferation is to use
technology-specific credit multipliers within one common certificate market
for all renewable energy technologies.29 But credit multipliers are prone to
another distortion of the REC market. Different technologies do not move in
lockstep but at different speeds along their uniquely shaped and sloped
technology learning curves.' 0 As a result, credit multipliers, even if initially
set at the correct ratio, soon become inaccurate, eventually over-
incentivizing some technologies at the expense of others."' The technology-
specific design of RPS deployment policies continues to represent a huge
challenge in theory and practice. Accordingly, RPSs show only moderate
conceptual ability to leverage investment for a wide range of renewable
energy projects.
Interestingly, the limitations of tax credits as to the investor groups
they mobilize are somewhat inverse to those found in tender and RPS
regimes. On the one hand, the required tax liability to benefit from tax
credits deters investment from institutional investors who aim for high debt-
equity ratios.'4 The tax equity market may offer solutions through
alternative investment models but at considerable legal and other costs.2
Similarly, tax policies struggle to attract investment from tax-exempt
pension funds or sovereign wealth funds and other foreign entities unless
foreign investors already have a domestic business presence with sufficient
local tax liability. On the other hand, tax policies are relatively attractive
for domestic businesses and home owners, whose tax obligations tend to be
high enough to reap the full benefit of tax credits for rooftop photovoltaic
and other small-scale renewable power plants. Finally, size- and technology-
specific tax credit designs can account for the different cost characteristics
of various plant sizes and renewable energy technologies. Overall, tax
credits show moderate capacity to appeal to a broad range of investors, but
feature excellent potential to incentivize investment in a wide variety of
renewables projects.
Feed-in tariffs show excellent capacity to appeal to a broad range of
investors, and they also incentivize a wide variety of investment
238 See Davies, supra note 44, at 1375. For further discussion of the concerns related to REC
market proliferation, see id. at 1375-95.
239 Id at 1376-78.
240 Id. See also PATRICK HEARPS & DYLAN MCcONNELL, MELBOURNE ENERGY INST., RENEWABLE
ENERGY TECHNOLOGY COST REVIEW 17, 27, available at http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-
201 1/commissioned-work/renewable-energy-technology-cost-review.pdf.
241 See Davies, supra note 44, at 1376-78. Unlike feed-in tariffs, credit multipliers within RPS
regimes do not set technology-specific tariff degression rates to account for different
technology learning effects. Id.
242 Accordingly, one commentator refers to production tax credits as "the rich man's feed-in
tariff." See David Toke, Are Green Electricity Certificates the Way forward for Renewable
Energy? An Evaluation of the United Kingdom's Renewables Obligation in the Context of
International Comparisons, 23 ENVT. & PLANNING C: GOV'T & POL'Y 361, 368 (2005).
243 BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 41, at 13.
244 See Paul Schwabe et al., Mobilizing Public Markets to Finance Renewable Energy
Projects: Insights from Expert Stakeholdels, National Renewable Energy Laboratory Technical
Report No. NREI/TP-6A20-55021, at ii, 3 (2012), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2083851.
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opportunities. Like tax credits, feed-in tariffs can easily accommodate size-
245and technology-specific tariff structures. As a result, they attract
investment in a rich array of renewable energy technologies for applications
of various sizes, from utility-scale to distributed generation .2  The lack of a
REC trading requirement or need for tax equity make feed-in tariffs
attractive for institutional, strategic, business, and private investors alike. In
contrast to tax credits, feed-in tariffs are ideally suited to leverage foreign
investment, as evidenced by internationally funded renewable energy
247
generation facilities, such as those found in Spain.
B. Policy Impact on Market-Based Factors
Market-based "soft-cost" factors include grid access regulation,
dispatch priority, and the level of renewable energy investors' exposure to
the electricity market's forecast and balancing obligations.2 a
1. Grid Access
Conceptually, RPSs and tax policies are poorly designed to address and
resolve issues pertaining to the grid access of electricity generators drawing
on renewable sources of energy. Tax credit regimes focus on the
relationship between renewable energy plants and the State in a budgetary
context."' RPSs regulate the relationship between the State and renewables
plants through the issuance of RECs. By requiring REC procurement, RPSs
also regulate the relationship between the State and its utilities. RPSs do not,
however, regulate the relationship between renewable power generators and
their local utilities or network operators. The resolution of grid access
claims and the allocation of connection costs, therefore, remain outside the
conceptual scope of RPSs and tax policies!" As a result, grid access is often
245 See Pierre Bull et al., Designing Feed-in Tariff Policies to Scale Clean Distributed
Generation in the US, ELEC. J., Apr. 2011, at 52, 53-55. For a discussion of feed-in tariffs'
potential to support distributed generation applications of renewable energy technologies in the
U.S., see id
246 In Spain, for instance, feed-in tariff support for renewables has leveraged capital for the
deployment of solar facilities, ranging from solar photovoltaics rooftop installations to
Iberdrola's 50 MW solar thermal plant in Puertollano. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Solar Industry
LeansLessonsin Spanish Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2010, at Al.
247 For an investor's view of feed-in tariffs as an instrument to leverage cross-border renewable
energy investment, see Rainier Weng, Photovoltaic Investments Outside Germany? Looking into
the Southern EU States, THE SOLAR-SERVER: FORUM FOR SOLAR ENERGY, Apr. 23, 2007,
http://www.solarserver.com/solarmagazin/solar-report_0407_e.html (last visited July 20, 2012).
248 See infra Parts V.B.1-3.
249 See supra Part H.D.
250 As a tribute to their libertarian roots, RPSs are designed to leave the relationship between
generators and utilities or network operators to the market. See supra Part II.A.
251 Under the United Kingdom's Renewables Obligation RPS, grid access requirements and
procedures are regulated under the U.K. Grid Code with little to no preferential treatment for
renewables compared to their fossil fuel counterparts. See Klessmann et al., supra note 188,
at 3654; see also Gross & Heptonstall, supra note 66, at 16 (noting that the access requirements
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subject to inconsistent state or local regulation, adding considerable legal
uncertainty to investors' business plans.
Historically, tender regimes have not always included explicit
provisions related to grid access.' Conceptually, however, the legislative
framework behind tender regimes is well suited to include mandates for
granting grid access to incoming renewable power generators. The tender
regime's underlying framework already includes a mandate for the local
utility to purchase all of the winning bidder's electricity at the winning bid's
price. Moreover, tender regimes usually provide for recovery of the
additional cost in the form of a levy or system-benefits charge that is
distributed across all ratepayers. 25 3 Thus, tender regimes address the
electricity grid and its operators, as well as utilities and their customers, and
could well include a strong mandate to grant low-cost grid access to
renewable electricity generators. Until tender regimes harness their full
conceptual potential, however, grid access will remain a topic of concern
for investors. 25
Feed-in tariffs are every investor's favorite when it comes to their
excellent regulatory treatment of grid access. The feed-in prong guarantees
the right to interconnection as the policy's cornerstone.255 It should be noted,
however, that the actual strength of this right varies across feed-in tariff
regimes. Some implementations, for instance, make grid access rights
256
subject to network capacity constraints. More effective feed-in tariff
design guarantees grid access regardless of network capacity, and addresses
any capacity constraints through dispatch priority regulation. * Unlike other
deployment policies, feed-in tariffs usually include regulation to allocate the
costs of grid connection and any necessary network enforcements. The most
successful feed-in tariffs require that the renewables generator pay the cost
of connection to the closest grid access point, while the network operator
has to bear the cost of any necessary upgrades and reinforcements to the
grid.25 8 Figure 3 illustrates the crucial differences in the regulatory
frameworks behind RPSs and feed-in tariffs as they pertain to grid access.
of the U.K.'s grid connection system make it more difficult for renewables to get in the
connection queue).
252 See, e.g, Gross & Heptonstall, supra note 66, at 11, 15-16, 19.
253 See, e.g, id. at 8.
254 See Lithi & Prissler, supra note 101, at 4890.
255 See, e.g, MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39 at xxi, 30.
256 See, eg, Ontario's 2006 feed-in tariff that allows for the denial of grid access to incoming
renewables based on network capacity constraints. Id. at 31.
257 See infra Part V.B.2; Mormann, supra note 31, 955-57.
258 See, e.g, the German feed-in tariff's cost allocation regime. Klessmann et al., supra note
180, at 3651. In contrast, Spain's feed-in tariff follows hybrid approach where the plant operator
also bears the costs for upgrades and reinforcements at the distribution level but only part of
the costs at the transmission level. Id. at 3652. For an overview of the different cost allocation
approaches, see Mormann, supra note 31, 921-24.
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Figure 3. Grid Access Regulation under RPS and Feed-In Tariffs
2. Dispatch Priority
Tax and RPS policies are poorly conceived to guarantee dispatch
priority to renewable energy plants. As discussed in the context of grid
access, their regulatory frameworks are not designed to address the
relationship between generators and network operators." It is hardly
surprising, then, that the aforementioned example of renewables output
curtailment-Texas-employs an RPS to promote the deployment of
renewable energy technologies.2"
Conceptually, tender regimes offer excellent capacity to award dispatch
priority to renewable energy technologies. The British Non-Fossil Fuel
Obligation, for instance, mandated that all electricity from renewable
generation be bought regardless of whether it was generated during times of
peak load or low demand.' Under its tender regime for offshore wind
deployment, Denmark, also, guarantees dispatch priority to the power
produced from the successful bidder's wind turbines.262
Feed-in tariffs also demonstrate excellent capacity to guarantee
dispatch priority for renewable energy technologies under their feed-in
prong. Accordingly, leading feed-in tariff countries like Spain 20  or
Germany 0 guarantee renewable power generators dispatch priority over
their fossil
fuel competitors.
259 See supra Part V.B.1.
260 For further information on the Texas RPS see David Hurlbut, A Look Behind the Texas
Renewable Portfoo Standard: A Case Study, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 129, 130 (2008).
261 Mitchell, supra note 228, at 1087.
262 See ENERGIE, EUROPEAN COMM'N, CONCERTED ACTION FOR OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY
DEPLOYMENT 35-37 (2005), available at http://www.offshorewindenergy.org/cod/Final COD
reportlegal-frameworks.pdf.
263 See Klessmann et al., supra note 188, at 3651-53 (discussing Spain's Royal Decree
661/2007).






3 Forecast and Balancing Responsibilities
RPSs and tax policies are poorly conceived to offer investors protection
from the electricity market's forecast and balancing responsibilities. Both
require renewables plants to sell their electricity through the same market as
other power generators.26 5 This market generally requires participants to
comply with its forecast obligations, and to accept financial responsibility
for any charges incurred by balancing service deviations." Accordingly, the
United Kingdom's Renewables Obligation, one of the most internationally
prominent RPS regimes, requires renewables plants to bear the full forecast
and balancing responsibility for their electricity output."" Others, like the
Pacific Northwest's Bonneville Power Administration, charge intermittently
operating renewable power plants a flat "integration rate" for every unit of
electricity fed into the grid, so as to cover the network operator's balancing
expenses while limiting the plant's balancing responsibility and risk.2 68
Similarly, the California Independent System Operator has established the
Participating Intermittent Resource Program that charges intermittent
renewables plants for balancing services only in the amount of their net
monthly forecast deviations.'" As over-forecasting and under-forecasting
errors tend to cancel each other out, at least in part, the monthly aggregation
of forecast deviations aims to limit the net liability of intermittent renewable
power plants for balancing costs in California.2" These arrangements reflect
the tremendous importance of limited risk exposure for intermittent
electricity generation from renewables. They also illustrate the regulatory
complexity and challenges of limited balancing responsibility caused by
policymakers' reliance on tax credits and RPS policies.
Tender regimes and feed-in tariffs are better suited to incorporate
protection from the electricity market's forecast and balancing
responsibilities, as both policies are designed to operate outside the
market's forward-trading regime. They require the local utility or network
operator to buy all power directly from the renewable power generator at
the price set by the winning bid or the established tariff.271 The risk of output
intermittency and the responsibility for imbalance settlements can easily be
assigned to the local utility or network operator. In exchange, the latter can
recoup all associated balancing costs from their ratepayers, along with the
265 See supra Part V.B.1.
266 Supra notes 182--84 and accompanying text.
267 See Klessmann et al., supra note 180, at 3653.
268 For a detailed discussion of one federal agency's rationale for its integration rate, see
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., WP-10-A-02/TR-10-A-02, 2010 WHOLESALE POWER AND TRANSMISSION
RATE ADJUSTMENT PROCEEDING (BPA-10)-ADMINISTRATOR'S FINAL RECORD OF DECISION 235-42
(July 2009), available athttp://www.bpa.gov/corporate/pubs/RODS/2009/.
269 For more information on the Participating Intermittent Resource Program, see California
ISO, Participating intermittent program iniiative, http://www.caiso.com/1817/181783ae9a9O
.html (last visited July 21, 2012).
270 For a numerical example of these netting effects, see: http://www.caiso.com/Documents/
PlRPSettlementChargesReport_JandJun2O1l.pdf (last visited July 21, 2012).
271 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 92; Finon, supra note 71, at 115.
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cost of the tender or feed-in tariff. This arrangement is especially fruitful
under feed-in tariffs, which, unlike tender regimes, promote not only utility-
scale plants, but also distributed generation facilities such as solar rooftop
installations. These small- or medium-sized plants rarely have the expertise,
overhead, or capacity to engage in sophisticated forecasting. Therefore,
concentrating their forecast and balancing responsibilities in the hands of
the local utility or network operator is likely to prove both more effective
and more efficient, building on existing economies of scale.11 It is for these
reasons, and others outlined below, that this Article rates the capacity
of feed-in tariffs to favorably impact forecast and balancing responsibilities
as excellent and, hence, higher than tender regimes, which receive a
good rating.
Feed-in tariffs can be designed to incentivize the assumption of forecast
obligations and balancing responsibilities by renewables plant operators in
the longer term. As market-penetration rates increase for intermittent
renewable energy technologies, the overall cost of their forecast and
balancing requirements may become too great a burden to distribute among
ratepayers.2 7 3 At the same time, such high levels of penetration imply
advances in market maturity and cost-competitiveness that will enable
intermittent renewable power generators to assume forecast and balancing
responsibilities and still operate profitably and competitively. Feed-in tariffs
have the conceptual flexibility to encourage this transition. The Spanish
feed-in tariff, for instance, offers a choice between two tariff options. 274 The
fixed tariff option provides traditional feed-in tariff remuneration and large-
scale exemptions from forecast and balancing responsibilities.27 5
The premium tariff option offers a premium payment in addition to the
market rate for electricity, but requires participation in the electricity
market's forward-trading regime and compliance with its imbalance
settlement requirements.7
272 There is an inherent agency problem in this arrangement, as the ability to pass any
balancing costs on to ratepayers may deter network operators from diligent forecasting. As a
result of their natural network monopoly, however, these operators are subject to close
regulatory scrutiny, which can easily include a review of their forecast and balancing efforts.
Christine Miller, Advancing Regulation with Respect to Smart Grids: Pioneering Examples from
the United Kingdom and Italy, in FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION AND REGULATION
IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES (Nov. 25, 2011) available athttp://www.crninet.com/2011/cl0a.pdf.
273 Several independent studies have shown, however, that the overall system cost of
intermittency is relatively low, up to a market share of 30% for wind and other intermittent
renewables technologies. See, e.g, J. Charles Smith et al., Utilty Wind Integration and
Operating Impact State of the Art, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYs. 900, 900 (2007),
available athttp://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/41329.pdf; TIMUR GOL & TILL STENZEL, VARIABILITY
OF WIND POWER AND OTHER RENEWABLES 8 (2005), available at http://www.uwig.org/
IEA._Report on variability.pdf.
274 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 40.
275 See Klessmann et al., supra note 188, at 3650-51.
276 For a detailed discussion of the Spanish feed-in tariff options, see MENDONQA ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 40-42; Klessmann et al., supra note 188, at 3651-53.
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C Pohey inpact on Behavioral Factors-Social Acceptance
Tax policies offer poor capacity to improve the public perception of
renewable energy technologies, or, rather, of their deployment in people's
proverbial backyards. The need for income or other forms of tax liability to
offset, has given tax credits the public image of a "rich man's" policy."
Worse still, the immediate effects on the public budget give the impression
that tax credits offer already wealthy renewables entrepreneurs the chance
to enrich themselves further at the taxpayers' expense.278
Tender regimes, too, have relatively poor potential to disperse local
concerns over the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies.
As indicated, the tender process primarily targets energy incumbents or
institutional investors with industry-specific experience. As a result, tenders
create few opportunities for local investment.279 Moreover, site-specific
tenders are usually announced at the state or national level with limited
involvement or consideration of local governments and their concerns.
Under the British Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation's tender regime, for instance,
local communities felt overwhelmed and bypassed by the speed of
deployment, with some feeling "that wind energy deployment was happening
too quickly, with too limited a local involvement."m In terms of cost
recovery, the general perception of tender regimes tends to be slightly more
positive than of tax credits, as the distribution of policy costs among
ratepayers is generally considered to be fairer than their socialization
across taxpayers.
The moderately positive public view of RPS policies benefits from their
widespread characterization as market-based instruments rather than
subsidies. Closer scrutiny of their implementation, however, reveals that
utilities normally recoup their additional costs for REC procurement by
passing them on to ratepayers, just like under tender regimes or feed-in
tariffs.'8' More importantly, the considerable transaction costs stemming
from REC trading have earned RPSs the reputation of being "big
corporation" policies that afford little access to local investors to participate
in the profits from renewables deployment. 8' Local suspicion of RPS
regimes and the deployment they support is further fueled by the lack of a
transparent and regulated market for certificate trading.2
In contrast, feed-in tariffs show good conceptual capacity to improve
the public perception of renewable energy deployment. The greatest asset of
277 See Toke, supra note 242, at 368.
278 See Timothy P. Carney, Grants for Renewable Energy Test Patty Pinciples, WASH. EXAM'R,
Dec. 21, 2011, http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/1020881 (last visited July 7, 2012).
279 See supra Part IV.A.3.
280 Mitchell, supra note 228, at 1082.
281 See Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 46, at 1410-12. For a detailed discussion
of a New Mexico utility's attempt to pass its REC expenses onto ratepayers, see id at 1412-14.
282 Birer & Wuistenhagen, supra note 14, at 5005.
283 See Kelly Crandall, Comment, Trust and the Green Consumer: The Flght for
Accountabilty in Renewable Energy Credits, 81 U. COLO. L. REv. 893, 950-52 (2010) (calling for
greater transparency around REC purchases).
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feed-in tariff policies in their plight for local acceptance is their capacity to
attract local investment in renewable energy technologies.as Feed-in tariff
support for distributed generation allows private households to partake in
the environmental and economic benefits derived from renewables
deployment, for example, through solar photovoltaic panels on their roofs.285
With their own stake in the Race to Renewables, local constituents no longer
feel like the victims of an aesthetic assault on their backyards by anonymous
corporate wind developers. European feed-in tariff representatives, such as
Denmark or Germany, have long utilized the power of popular participation
to promote renewables deployment. In 2009, more than 200,000 Danish
families were stakeholders in local wind farms."6 Similarly, hundreds of
thousands of Germans have become shareholders in so-called "citizens' wind
farms" scattered across the country.287 Nonetheless, poorly administered
feed-in tariffs can damage the public perception of renewables if regulators
fail to adjust tariff rates to track cost-improvements as renewable energy
technologies mature. No ratepayer wants to fund windfall profits for project
developers through feed-in tariff rates that fail to take into account, for
example, the tumbling prices of solar panels.
D. Summary
The qualitative "soft-cost" factor analysis of feed-in tariffs, RPSs, tax
credits, and tender regimes offers a compelling explanation for the
differences in policy efficacy and efficiency observed in the lEA study.as The
superior performance of feed-in tariff countries can be attributed to the
greater conceptual capacity of feed-in tariffs to positively affect the "soft-
cost" factors that determine the investor appeal of renewable energy
technologies. Feed-in tariffs score highest across all investment-based and
market-based factors, as well as in their ability to improve the social
acceptance of renewable energy technologies.
Tender regimes assume a distant second place. Tender policies fare
especially well, albeit worse than feed-in tariffs, when considering all
market-based factors and transaction costs.2" However, tenders are poorly
designed to positively affect social acceptance and to attract a wide range of
284 See Miguel Mendonga et al., Stability, Particpation and Transparency in Renewable
Energy Policy: Lessons from Denmark and the United States, 27 POL'Y & SOCIETY 379,
384-85 (2009).
285 Id.
286 Stefan Gsanger, Community Power Empowers, DISCOVERY NEWS, May 26, 2009,
http://news.discovery.com/tech/community-wind-power-opinion.htnl (last visited July 21, 2012);
see also Nicolaj Stenkjaer, Wind 7trbine Co-Ops in Denmark, NORDIC FOLKECENTER FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY, Dec. 2008, http://www.folkecenter.net/gb/rd/wind-energy/48007/
windturbinecoopsdk/ (last visited July 21, 2012) (discussing the development of wind energy
cooperatives in Denmark).
287 Gsanger, supra note 286.
288 See supra Part III.
289 See supra Parts V.A.2, V.B.
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investors for a variety of investment opportunities.290 The heterogeneity of
the conceptual characteristics of tender regimes helps explain the wide
spread between Ireland's impressive deployment success and the mediocre
performance of other tender representatives such as India and Canada."
RPSs and tax policies demonstrate similarly limited conceptual
capacities to positively influence investor interest in the deployment of
renewable energy technologies. Tax credits claim a slight edge over RPSs
thanks to their relative strengths in keeping transaction costs down and
attracting a wider range of investors for a variety of investment
opportunities.292 The only relative strength of RPS regimes lies in their ability
to foster social acceptance of renewables deployment. m Overall, these
results correspond with the somewhat inconclusive but predominantly poor
to moderate deployment success of RPSs and tax policies according to the
IEA study. "4
Furthermore, the findings of this Article's qualitative analysis offer an
explanation for how international clean-tech investors perceive renewable
energy deployment policies.295 A recent survey asked principals and senior
managers from sixty venture capital and private equity firms to rate the
efficacy of policy options at stimulating investment interest in clean energy
technology projects."' Participants rated the efficacy of market-pull-i.e.,
deployment policies29-on a scale from one (very ineffective) to five (very
effective). Of all the surveyed market-pull policies, feed-in tariffs ranked the
highest, with an average effective score of 4.16, well ahead of tax credits
(3.35) and RPS (3.27) policies.us The survey did not explicitly ask
participants to rate the efficacy of tender regimes. However, the market-pull
options to be rated included public procurement policies that resemble and,
in some cases, may include tender regimes. Remarkably, the surveyed
investors rated public procurement policies as slightly more effective than
tax credits and RPSs, but well below feed-in tariffs."' Thus, the survey
participants' rating of deployment policies' efficacy at stimulating
investment in clean energy technologies is consistent with-and can be
explained through-the findings of the preceding qualitative analysis.
290 See supra Parts V.A.3., V.C.
291 See supra Part III.B.
292 See supra Part V.A.
293 See supra Part V.C.
294 See supra Parts III.B-C.
295 See Biurer & Wiustenhagen, supra note 14, at 4997-98.
296 Id. at 4999.
297 The survey defines market-pull policies to include "strategic deployment policies relevant
to the pre-commercial stage of technology development all the way down to the supported
commercial stage of technology maturity." Id at 5001-02.
298 Id. at 5002 fig.3. Interestingly, REC policy options were surveyed separately from RPS
policies but received a similarly low efficacy rating (3.22). Id.
299 Id (noting an efficacy rate of 3.38).
724 Vol. 42:681
2012] ENHANCING THEINVESTORAPPEAL OFRENEWABLE ENERGY 725
VI. TOWARD A MORE INVESTOR-ORIENTED U.S. RENEWABLES POLICY
Both empirical evidence across the globe and this Article's qualitative
"soft-cost" factor analysis suggest that the United States would be well
advised to adopt a feed-in tariff approach to leverage greater investment in
renewable energy. However, designing and implementing a feed-in tariff that
spurs sustainable growth of U.S. renewables while limiting the financial
burden on ratepayers requires careful consideration of a number of factors,
and must not be rushed into.3w In the meantime, well-targeted, specific
adjustments to the currently employed policy instruments represent crucial
first steps toward a more investor-oriented U.S. renewables policy.nl
A. Adjustments to Current US Pobcy Instruments
For the past quarter of a century, renewable energy policy in the United
States has been dominated by RPSs and tax credits.30 2 Based on this Article's
qualitative analysis, both policy instruments would considerably improve
their attractiveness to investors if they offered a more favorable treatment of
the "soft-cost" factors related to the electricity market structure, such as grid
access, dispatch priority, and balancing responsibilities."30 In addition,
policy-specific tweaks in design and implementation could significantly
improve the impact of RPSs and production tax credits on investment-based
"soft-cost" factors and, hence, enhance their ability to leverage investment in
renewable energy technologies.
1. Enhancing the Market Efficiency of RPSs
There are about thirty state-level RPS regimes in force in the United
States today.' Under these RPSs, renewable energy investors are exposed
to the dual market risks of the wholesale electricity market (to sell their
power) and the REC market (to sell the certificates they receive for relying
on renewables).06 The REC market in particular imposes enormous
uncertainty on the profit expectations of investors and, as a result, drives up
the cost of capital.
The absence of a unified national REC market and the multiplicity of
competing standards have led to a proliferation of state certificate
300 See nfra Part VIB.
301 See infra Part VI.A.
302 See Welton, supra note 6, at 991.
303 See supra Parts IV-V.
304 See infra Parts VI.A. 1-2.
305 As of June 2012, 29 states and the District of Columbia have implemented RPS regimes.
See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Quantitative RPS Data Project
http://www.dsireusaorg/rpsdatalindex.cfm (under Archives by Year, click on "RPSspread051812
.xlsx") (last visited July 20, 2012).
306 Other RPS regimes, such as the United Kingdom's Renewables Obligation, expose
investors to a total of four distinct market risks. See Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 72, at 18-21.
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markets.17 The various state RPS mandates have brought forth a panoply of
inconsistent definitions of eligible renewable energy technologies. As a
result, the U.S. renewables market has splintered into regional and state
markets, offering investors poor liquidity and, with it, enormous volatility."'
The problem posed by different REC definitions is exacerbated by
conflicting rules on the treatment and value of these certificates.? The REC
shelf life, for instance, ranges from three years in Michigan, to indefinite
validity in Arizona. 310 The vastly different ability to bank RECs for future sale
or proof of compliance directly affects their market value, and inevitably
fosters the creation of different REC sub-classes. To make matters worse,
there is not even a universally accepted currency for state-issued RECs.
While most states award one certificate per MWh of eligible electricity, some
issue RECs on a per kWh basis." In addition, state RPS mandates vary
considerably in their aspirational aggressiveness, as well as in their planning
and enforcement rigor, all of which affect-directly or indirectly-the
market value of RECs. 312 This multiplicity of state RPS mandates has
produced huge fluctuations in certificate market prices, ranging from $1.75
in California to $35 in New England for a REC over 1 MWh of wind energy.'
With such uncertainty, it is hardly surprising that investors are reluctant to
fund U.S. renewable energy projects, and, when they do so, charge a
premium for their risk exposure.
A federal RPS is often celebrated as the panacea that would reduce the
REC market risk to investors by creating a unified national certificate
market with harmonized definitions, accounting, and compliance rules.314 A
more liquid, transparent, and less volatile national REC market could indeed
be expected to increase investment in renewable energy technologies, while
saving utilities and ratepayers billions of dollars."5 Washington's history of
more than twenty-five failed proposals for a federal RPS, however, makes it
politically unlikely that a federal RPS will unify the panoply of fragmented
state REC markets in the near future.
307 Welton, supra note 6, at 999-1000.
308 Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 46, at 105.
309 Id
310 Davies, supra note 44, at 1378.
311 Id
312 See id. at 1360-61.
313 Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 46, at 105.
314 See Davies, supra note 44, at 1363; Sovacool & Cooper, State Efforts to Promote
Renewable Energy, supra note 46, at 8; Welton, supra note 6, at 999.
315 See Berendt, supra note 179, at 66 ("The security that a liquid national REC market would
bring to U.S. renewable energy finance is of paramount importance."). For projections of the
expected savings in compliance costs, see Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra
note 46, at 108-09. See also Davies, supra note 44, at 1379 ("Federal competition should not just
make REC prices more uniform; it should drive them down.").
316 For a summary of the congressional deadlock over a federal RPS see Davies, supra note
44, at 1341-42. See also Welton, supra note 6, at 996.
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In the meantime, RPS states should continue to fulfill their role as
laboratories of democracy," but cooperate more to create a harmonized
RPS market from the bottom-up. The Northeast's Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative and the Western Climate Initiative have demonstrated the ability of
regional, multi-state collaboration to combat climate change." To better
align REC trading with the physical sale and delivery of electricity, I
recommend that states join forces to create regional certificate trading
markets that unite RPS states in the Eastern and Western Interconnects."' In
the near term, RPS states would be well advised to at least increase the
transparency and predictability of their in-state REC markets, for example
by replacing the widespread over-the-counter trade of certificates with a
mandatory trading platform. Such a platform could build on the certificate
tracking systems developed in Texas, Wisconsin, and the New England
Power Pool. 20 More transparent REC markets would also do a better job of
conveying relevant information to potential investors, such as how close a
jurisdiction is to reaching its RPS target. At present, prospective investors
have to rely on publicly available information about pending interconnection
applications in order to assess the market's saturation. 321' The transmission
interconnection queue, however, is a poor source of information, since many
proposed projects apply for interconnection long before they secure
financing or regulatory approval and, as a result, never come to fruition.
317 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
318 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) originates from an invitation of New
York's then Governor George Pataki to his fellow Northeast governors for concerted action
against climate change. For details regarding the political process that eventually gave birth to
RGGI see Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1958, 1959-60 (2007). The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) consists of seven western U.S.
states--Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington-and four
Canadian provinces-British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Qu6bec. The WCI published
design recommendations for its own cap-and-trade program in September of 2008. See Western
Climate Initiative, The WCI Cap & Trade Program, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-
wci-cap-and-trade-program (last visited July 21, 2012). For an investigation of the
constitutionality of such a multi-state approach under the Dormant Commerce Clause and
Compact Clause, see Berendt, supra note 179, at 61-65.
319 The Eastern Interconnect covers parts of Montana, Texas and South Dakota as well as
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and points east. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, North American
Electric Reliability Corporation Interconnections, available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/NERCInterconnection_1A.pdf. The Western Interconnect
encompasses the rest of Montana, Texas, and South Dakota as well as Colorado, New Mexico,
and all points west. See id. The Texas Interconnect, finally, serves most of Texas. Id.
320 For an explanation of the certificate tracking systems developed in Texas, Wisconsin, and
the New England Power Pool, see Berendt, supra note 179, at 58.
321 For an introduction to the mechanics of the transmission interconnection queue under
FERC Order 2003, see NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COLLABORATIVE, TRANSISSION UPDATE-April
2008 (2008), available at http://www.nationalwind.org/assets/publications/NWCCTransmission
Update.pdf.
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2 Complementing Tax Credits with Direct Subsidies
The need for sufficient tax liabilities to reap the benefits of the federal
tax credit program has already been identified as a major deterrent to
renewables investment in the United States.3" A recent study illustrates the
enormous cost of tax equity to investors and taxpayers.3' Between 2005 and
2008, tax credits worth $10.3 billion were drawn to deploy some 19 gigawatts
(GW) of new wind turbine generation capacity.32' Factoring in the cost of tax
equity, the same deployment could have been achieved with approximately
$5 billion in direct cash subsidies-in other words, at half the cost to
taxpayers and the mounting national budget deficit.3"
Until a feed-in tariff establishes a direct cash subsidy for renewable
energy deployment and reassigns the associated costs to ratepayers rather
than taxpayers, the federal tax credit should be complemented with an
option to receive cash subsidies instead. Such an opt-out would not yet fully
remove the burden of tax credits on the national budget, but it would, at
least, ensure more efficient use of taxpayers' money and, hence, help relieve
the national budget deficit. From 2009 to 2011, the Treasury's section 1603
Cash Grant offered this sort of cash subsidy in lieu of tax credits, which
revived America's struggling renewable energy industry.32 6 Regrettably, the
section 1603 Grant was not extended beyond 2011 and federal support for
renewables deployment has reverted back to its historic reliance on tax
incentives alone.327 To maintain the investor appeal of renewable energy in
the United States, and spare the industry another chapter in its long history
of boom and bust cycles,a" I recommend the immediate renewal of the
section 1603 Cash Grant.
B Keys to Feed-In Tarziff Success in the United States
Successful feed-in tariff design and implementation represent a huge
challenge. In contrast to RPSs or other quantity-based policy instruments,
regulators cannot rely on the market's invisible hand to determine the
322 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
323 BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 41, at 11.
324 Id at 13.
325 Id
326 Id at 17. For an overview of the section 1603 grant and its promotional success, see U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Recovery Act, 1603 Program: Payments for Specified Energy Property in
Lieu of Tax Credits, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/1603.aspx (last visited
July 21, 2012).
327 See Gloria Gonzales, Expiration of Cash Grant to Affect Biomass & Wind More than
So/a, OILPRICE.COM, Jan. 9, 2012, http://oilprice.com/Altemative-Energy/Renewable-Energy/
Expiration-of-Cash-Grant-to-Affect-Biomass-Wind-More-than-Solar.htmil (last visited July 21,
2012) (pointing out that the expiration of the cash grant program will be particularly hard on
small-scale projects that lack sufficient tax equity).
328 See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY I, supra note 7, at 107-08 (referring to "substantial boom-and-
bust cycles in U.S. wind power installations in the 2000s"); Mortenson, supra note 68, at 183
(noting that without economic incentives "(h]istorically, wind turbine activity has
dropped dramatically").
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appropriate level of financial support. As a price-based policy, feed-in tariffs
require regulators to set tariff rates at a level that balances investor needs
with ratepayer concerns.ss To harness the full promotional potential of feed-
in tariffs, a multi-tiered tariff structure should account for differences across
technology strands and project sizes. Finally, a successful feed-in tariff
must be compatible with, and sensitive to, the existing panoply of competing
policy approaches at the U.S. state and federal level."
1. Getting the Tariff Right-And Keeping it Right
To effectively leverage investment in American renewable energy, a
U.S. feed-in tariff must offer financial subsidies that allow investors to make
a reasonable profit without imposing an undue burden on electricity
ratepayers. Argentina's feed-in tariff experience illustrates that, if the tariff is
set too low, it will fail to attract the necessary investment to deploy
renewable energy technologies. As a concession to political opposition,
Argentina's 2006 feed-in tariff for wind energy was set too low to inspire
serious investment, leaving deployed wind capacity stable at a meager 30
MW nationwide-the equivalent of fifteen present-day wind turbines.332 At
the other end of the spectrum, a tariff that is set too high will impose undue
hardship on electricity ratepayers and undermine public support for
renewables, as Spain's feed-in tariff for solar photovoltaics has
demonstrated. The Spanish regulators chose to adopt rates similar to
Germany's widely praised feed-in tariff, only to find out that, in reality, these
rates were far too high in light of Spain's 60%-greater insolation as compared
to Germany.= As a result, the Spanish tariff offered renewable energy
investors windfall profits at the expense of ratepayers, eroding public
support for renewables and eventually forcing the Spanish government to
suspend its feed-in tariff.3
Feed-in tariff rate determination tends to follow one of two approaches.
The value-based method aims to securitize the long-term benefits of
renewable energy related to electricity transmission, energy security, public
health, environmental conservation, etc.3 The cost-based method aims to
bridge the gap between current electricity market rates and the levelized
cost of electricity generation from renewables, including a return on
investment of 5/-10%. ' I recommend setting the rates of a U.S. feed-in tariff
329 Seeinfra Part VI.B.1.
330 See infra Part VI.B.2.
331 See infra Part VI.B.3.
332 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 57.
333 Id. at 58-59.
33 See Press Release, Council of Ministers of Spain, The Government Will Temporarily
Suspend Premiums For New Special Regime Facilities (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.
minetur.gob.es/en-US/GabinetePrensa/NotasPrensa/2012/Paginas/npregimenespecial270112.
aspx (last visited July 21, 2012).
335 Bull et al., supra note 245, at 53.
336 Id.; MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 19.
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according to the cost-based methodn7 The value-based method would run
counter to the presently prevailing regime of American electricity rate
regulation based on the cost of service. Also, adopting a value-based
approach for renewable energy technologies would require reconsidering
the economic and environmental benefits of traditional fossil fuel
technologies, including the present externalization of their environmental
costs. While environmentally desirable, such a far-reaching reform of the
electricity sector appears politically unlikely in the near future? In contrast,
the cost-based approach would allow for a reasonable U.S. feed-in tariff to
be set by building on existing institutions and expertise. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and State Public Utility Commissions have long set
electricity rates based on the cost of service for conventional power
generation technologies." Their vast regulatory experience and expertise
can help determine the appropriate feed-in tariff rates for renewable
energy technologies.
Going forward, vigilant regulatory oversight and frequent adjustments
will be needed to ensure that the rates of a U.S. feed-in tariff keep up with
cost improvements in renewable energy technologies. Growth in deployed
capacity enables technology learning which, in turn, reduces generation
costs and brings renewable energy technologies closer to grid parity.''
Along the way, feed-in tariffs require constant monitoring and modification
to keep investor returns reasonable and avoid windfall profits from tariffs
that, for example, fail to decrease along with the tumbling prices of solar
panels. Otherwise, a feed-in tariff that started out with appropriate rates may
eventually become the victim of its own success. Following record
deployment of 7.5 GW of new solar capacity in 2011 alone, Germany saw fit
to reduce its tariff rates before the end of the scheduled review interval.32
337 For the one exception to this rule regarding the addition of a site-sensitive component to
the U.S. feed-in tariff, see infra Part VI.B.2.
338 For further discussion of U.S. electricity rate regulation, see Tooraj Janasb & Michael
Pollitt, Liberalisation and R&D in Network Industries: The Case of the Electricity Industry, 37
RESEARCH POL'Y 995, 1003-05 (2008) (discussing electricity regulation in the U.S. and its effects
on technological innovation); John W. Mayo & Joseph E. Flynn, The Effects of Regulation on
Research and Development: Theory and Evidence, 61 J. Bus. 321 (1988) (examining the
relationship between regulation and investment in research and development in the utility
industry); MARK W. FRANK, THE IMPACT OF RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION ON TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION 6-24 (2001) (discussing rate-of-return regulation and its development in the U.S.).
339 For a discussion of the political difficulties and conceptual challenges of internalizing the
environmental costs of electricity generation from fossil fuels through emission pricing, see
Mormann, supra note 31, 929-33.
340 See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricty Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L.
435, 443-53 (2002).
341 Technology learning and cost-reduction varies by technology dependent upon the level
of market maturity. Solar photovoltaics, for instance, has historically experienced cost
reductions of 22% for every doubling of capacity. HEARPS & MCCONNELL, supra note 229, at 15.
The cost of onshore wind energy facilities has come down by only 10% for every doubling of
capacity. Id. at 26.
342 See Matthias Lang & U. Mutschler, Bundesrat Clears Reduced German Solar Feed-in
Tariffs, GERMAN ENERGY BLOG, http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=9756 (last visited July 21,
2012). For critical reactions to Germany's record solar deployment in 2011, see Vera Eckert &
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To account for the record deployment's achieved economies of scale and
technology learning, the German government decided to reduce its tariff
rates by up to 30% for utility-scale solar installations.
Regulators should ensure the continued accuracy of payments under a
U.S. feed-in tariff in two ways. First, the tariff should include a standard rate
of degression that inspires and anticipates cost reductions due to technology
advancements. The degression rate should vary according to the level of
maturity of eligible technology strands, as less mature technologies tend to
experience relatively greater technology improvements and cost reductions
than their more mature counterparts.' To track these cost reductions as
closely as possible, degression rates should be designed to lower tariff rates
gradually; for example, in monthly intervals." Second, the legislation for a
U.S. feed-in tariff should establish a regime for periodic revision of tariff
rates in case technology development is not fully reflected in the standard
degression rate. Feed-in tariff veteran Germany, for instance, reviews its
tariff rates at least once every four years."" As a relative novice to the feed-in
tariff community, the Canadian province of Ontario has opted for a biennial
review process." In light of the limited experience with feed-in tariffs in the
United States, tariff rates should be reviewed at least once every two years
in the early stages of implementation. Over time, review intervals can be
extended to account for greater experience and better accuracy of the
technology development forecast reflected in the standard degression rates.
2. Structuring a Nuanced, Muld-77ered Feed-In Tariff
To appeal to the broadest possible pool of investors and encourage
investment in a wide range of renewables projects, a U.S. feed-in tariff
should feature a nuanced, multi-tiered tariff structure that differentiates
between technology strands, project sizes, and project sites.
Christoph Steitz, Update 2-German Solar Boom Strengthens Cites of Subsidies, REUTERS, Jan.
9, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/09/grid-regulator-solar-idUSL6E8C90YL20120109
(last visited July 21, 2012).
343 See Lang & Mutschler, supra note 342. Such drastic cuts are often mistaken for proof of
the expensive and wasteful nature of feed-in tariffs. My analysis suggests that, instead, they
ought to be acknowledged as a tribute to the success at leveraging investment in renewable
energy technologies that, in turn, fosters technology learning and cost reductions.
344 See MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 49 (explaining that emerging technologies
like solar photovoltaics with more rapidly declining generation costs should have higher
degression rates).
345 In contrast to an annual degression rate, a monthly degression avoids boom-and-bust
cycles that tend to occur before and after the tariff rates' annual reductions. See, e.g., CLAIRE
KREYCIK ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A20-50225, INNOVATIVE FEED-IN
TARIFF DESIGNS THAT LIMIT POLICY COSTS 20-21 (2011), available at http://www.nrel.gov/
docslfyllosti/50225.pdf (noting that Oregon PUC rates more accurately reflected actual costs
due to a bi-annual adjustment of rates, according to developer response).
346 MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 39, at 36.
347 For details on the Ontario review process with nearly 2,900 surveys, over 200 written
submissions, and meetings with over 80 stakeholders see ONTARIO MINISTRY OF ENERGY,
ONTARIO'S FEED-IN TARIFF PROGRAM: Two-YEAR REVIEW REPORT (2012), available at http://
www.energy.gov. on.ca/docslen/FIT-Review-Report.pdf.
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A technology-neutral feed-in tariff with one rate for all renewable
energy technologies would likely trigger a run for the current least-cost
technologies, such as biomass, hydro, and onshore wind.348 Emerging
technologies that still struggle with higher generation costs, such as solar
photovoltaics, geothermal, or tidal energy, would not receive the necessary
capital injection to achieve economies of scale.3'0 In light of the magnitude of
the required transformation to decarbonize our present carbon-intensive
energy sector, it would be unwise to limit U.S. promotion of renewables to a
few select technologies. Today's narrow focus may well drive up tomorrow's
cost of renewables, as the necessary resources such as suitable sites for
hydro and wind projects grow scarce.'5 In addition, a narrow focus may
ignore the long-term growth potential for emerging technologies and thereby
hurt the U.S. bid for leadership in the global battle over technology
innovation. Following the international trend, a U.S. feed-in tariff should
include a multi-tiered rate structure that accounts for the cost
characteristics of eligible technologies and promotes investment in a broad
portfolio of renewable energy technologies.
This multi-tiered rate structure should further differentiate among
various renewables project sizes to account for their different cost
characteristics. For instance, a small-scale project for a solar photovoltaics
rooftop installation has a very different cost profile, and appeals
to a very different type of investor, than a large-scale solar photovoltaics
project in California's Mojave Desert.3 ' The comparison between building-
integrated distributed generation and large-scale projects in remote
locations with superior renewable energy resource availability points to the
utility of including site-differentiation in the U.S. feed-in tariff. A site-
sensitive tariff structure would bring about transmission-related and other
benefits of distributed generation as a result of reduced grid congestion,
avoided system losses, deferred investments, and lowered emissions of
environmental pollutants.3"
3 Ensuring Compatibility with Existing Policies
Design and implementation of a U.S. feed-in tariff must reflect the
existing policy framework for the deployment of renewable energy
technologies. The interplay with other policies determines the feed-in tariffs
ability to leverage the greatest possible investment in renewables at the
348 For a comparison of the generation costs of various renewable energy technologies, see
EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 13, at 14.
349 See STERN, supra note 30, at 357-58 ("Many new technologies that could be used to
reduce carbon emissions are not yet in widespread use. Trying to abate rapidly in the short
term-when the capital in industries emitting greenhouse gases is fixed and technologies are
given-can quickly become costly for firms, as the marginal cost of abatement is likely to
rise sharply.").
350 See Mormann, supra note 31, at 937.
351 For ongoing efforts to securitize these and other project types to make them attractive for
a broader range of investors see Schwabe et al., supra note 244.
352 Bull et al., supra note 245, at 55.
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lowest possible cost to American ratepayers. Consideration of all potential
overlap and interaction between a feed-in tariff and the existing panoply of
federal, state, and local policies lies beyond the scope of this Article.
However, a few key questions regarding the compatibility of a feed-in tariff
with RPSs and tax credits deserve special attention. In light of the
conceptual superiority of a feed-in tariff over the current tax credit regime,'
tax incentive support for U.S. renewables should be phased out as the feed-
in tariff goes online. Parallel use of both policies would not only drive up the
overall transaction costs for investors, who draw on U.S. policy support to
deploy renewable energy technologies, but it would also extend the burden
that tax credits currently impose on the growing national budget deficit.
Finally, concurrent use of both tax credits and a feed-in tariff would
exacerbate the challenge of setting appropriate tariff rates, as the value of
tax equity under the tax policy would add another component to the
complex rate-setting process for feed-in tariffs.
The potential interplay between feed-in tariffs and RPSs raises even
more complex questions. At the outset, regulators must decide whether both
policies are intended to compete with one another, or whether they conceive
of the feed-in tariff as the driver to achieve the renewables targets set by
RPSs.3M If both policies are to compete with one another, then renewable
energy investors could be given a choice between selling their power output
and RECs on their respective wholesale and certificate markets or, instead,
claiming the feed-in tariff payments. In this case, feed-in tariff legislation
should ensure that, in exchange for tariff payments, local utilities receive
ownership of a renewable electricity generator's RECs to avoid
double dipping."
Alternatively, a U.S. feed-in tariff could simply take the place of the
current tax credit support for renewables. In this scenario, renewable energy
investors would try to recover their cost and make a reasonable profit by
selling their power in exchange for feed-in tariff payments and continuing to
sell their RECs on the certificate market. However, I strongly advise against
this second option and urge the adoption of a U.S. feed-in tariff as the
principal driver to achieve RPS targets according to the first scenario. Both
empirical data and this Article's "soft-cost" factor analysis suggest that the
REC market's risks and uncertainties discourage investment in renewable
energy technologies. Accordingly, a feed-in tariff should be embraced as a
chance to limit the investor risk of deploying renewables at scale. Such
tandem use of a feed-in tariff and RPSs would by no means render REC
trading and the associated competitive forces moot. Rather, certificate
353 See supra Part V.D.
354 Originally, the literature erroneously viewed RPSs and feed-in tariffs as two mutually
exclusive policy instruments, but has since come to embrace the possibility that both may, in
fact, work in tandem. See Rickerson et al., supra note 70; Davies, supra note 44, at 83 (noting
that RPSs and feed-in tariffs "can work hand-in-glove").
355 In the present regulatory framework, such an automatic transfer of RECs would be
difficult as the treatment of a state-issued REC is subject to state law and varies across different
state RPS regimes. Davies, supra note 44, at 1364.
356 See supra Parts I.D, V.D.
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trading could take place among utilities to ensure that they meet their
respective RPS mandates. For instance, if a utility administered the feed-in
tariff to such success that it received more RECs than necessary to prove
compliance with its RPS mandate, the surplus certificates could be sold to
another less successful utility. The profits derived from these inter-utility
certificate trades could serve to recover the selling utility's feed-in tariff
payments and, hence, reduce the tariffs cost to the utility's ratepayers.
Renewable energy investors and project developers are wary of REC-related
risk, especially when it exposes them to markets they are unfamiliar with.5
Electric utility companies, in turn, are well experienced with these markets
and, therefore, represent the better bearer of REC-related risk.
VII. CONCLUSION
To serve as a catalyst for private-sector investment, policies to deploy
renewable energy technologies require more than just a minimum level of
financial remuneration. Such remuneration is a necessary-but by no means
sufficient-condition to deployment success. In addition, deployment
policies must have a positive impact on a variety of criteria that determine a
policy's investor appeal. This Article has condensed these criteria to a
framework of investment-based, market-based, and behavioral "soft-cost"
factors. A qualitative analysis of the primary policies used to promote
renewable energy deployment explains their vastly different policy
performance as the result of their ability, or inability, to favorably impact
these "soft-cost" factors. The results point to feed-in tariffs as the policy with
the greatest conceptual capacity to leverage investment in the deployment of
renewable energy technologies.
In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama pledged not to
cede the clean energy industry to China or Germany "because we refuse to
make the same commitment here."a"s Both China and Germany support their
surging clean energy industries with feed-in tariffs. It is time, indeed, that the
United States make the same commitment and adopt the very policy that has
propelled its competitors to become leaders in the Race to Renewables. It is
time to adopt a feed-in tariff that has the ability to cost-effectively enhance
the investor appeal of renewable energy in the United States.
357 See Lithi & Prassler, supra note 101, at 4889-90; Btirer & Wlstenhagen, supra note 14,
at 4999.
358 Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201201/24/remarks-president-state-uni
on-address (last visited July 21, 2012).
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